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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on social interactions and one exploring the 
application of machine learning. The first chapter develops a game-theoretic model of favor 
exchange where one can request indirect favors through a chain of contacts in a network. I 
study the cooperative behavior fostered by potential collective sanctions, provide a full 
characterization of “renegotiation-proof” networks and propose a robustness refinement. 
When the maximum length of contact chains is larger than 3, only star-shaped (i.e. highly 
centralized) networks achieve highest robustness. I provide empirical evidence of higher 
centrality in social networks from exploring network data from Indian rural villages.  
The second chapter studies whether there could be an evolutionary basis for 
discrimination against traits that are irrelevant to payoff. This study shows that 
discriminatory behaviors can be derived from non-discriminatory preferences. Each period 
the population is updated by a deterministic payoff-based update rule and incurs stochastic 
mutations. Without traits, in the long-run equilibrium agents coordinate on the risk 
dominant action. When traits are present and subject to change by population update and 
mutation, the long-run equilibria become the set of Pareto-efficient equilibria, among 
which a trait can be eliminated from the population and agents choose different actions 
		 vi 
based on opponent’s trait. In an alternative setting where traits cannot mutate or be adjusted 
and another inferior location is introduced, there exists an update rule that will lead to the 
Pareto-inefficient outcome where both locations are populated.  
The third chapter focuses on techniques to predict health outcomes at the census tract 
level and utilizes Machine Learning methods to reduce overfitting that traditional methods 
suffer from due to the large number of variables used. This study demonstrates how ex-
tensive data on social-demographic characteristics can be used to improve health outcome 
predictions relative to the previous literature that mostly focuses on using health-related 
variables. Using survey data from 2010 to 2015, I compare various regularization methods 
tuned by cross-validation by out-of-sample metrics and obtain high quality estimators of 
regional prevalence of 12 chronic diseases. 
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CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL NETWORK OF INDIRECT FAVOR EXCHANGE
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Favor exchange is a form of cooperation that I observe at every level of our lives, from
small to large favors. Although many favors such as borrowing and returning a large
amount of money and giving priority seats to those in need are sometimes enforced by
social, religious, legal and political norms, most favors remain informal. Another inter-
esting matter is that on many occasions, favor exchanges are not bilateral behaviors. For
example, if one person refuses to make a small loan, friends of the borrower may refuse
to perform favors for this person. In this case, punishment for not performing a favor is
carried out by other members in the social network. Lastly, it is common for a person to
seek a favor through a chain of contacts instead of from one’s direct friends. For example,
one may need to go through several contacts to set up a job interview.
Although there is substantial literature on social capital, relatively few study the game
theoretical foundation of such behaviors. Such literature focuses on empirical behaviors
instead of the relationship between social structures and individual motivations. These
studies are in the sociological literature and include Simmel (1950), Coleman (1988) and
Krackhardt (1996).
These characteristics—punishment through other members and chain of contacts—are
very relevant to the study of networks. Understanding structures of social interaction net-
works can help facilitate the diffusion of information and resources in those networks. For
example, promotion and management of microfinance can rely on the network’s structures.
For highly clustered structures, promotion should avoid wasting resources on targeting too
many agents in the same cluster. For a highly centralized network, promotion should target
agents with high centrality.
I develop a game theoretical model of indirect favor exchange networks in which one
1
can request favors through a chain of contacts, based on Jackson et al.’s (2012) model of
direct favor exchange in which one can only request favors from his or her direct contacts. I
study how their methods may extend to this new scenario and how equilibrium refinements
may require modification.
In this paper, I provide a game theoretical foundation of informal favor exchange in
social networks. In particular, I study situations in which simple bilateral enforcement is
not sufficient to sustain cooperation and it is the pressure from the network that fosters
cooperation. Bilateral interactions may be infrequent enough that they cannot self-enforce
cooperation or favor exchange. I examine the setting in which opportunities for one agent to
perform a favor for another agent arrive randomly over discrete time periods. An agent can
go through a chain of linked agents of an exogenously set length to seek a favor. Performing
a favor is costly and cannot be instantly repaid. But the benefit for the recipient exceeds the
cost incurred to who performs the favor, so it is efficient for social welfare if all favors are
performed when needed. However, since providing a favor is not instantly compensated, it
could be possible that it is not in an agent’s selfish interests to provide a favor even if that
means he or she will never receive favors from the recipient. A social network makes it
possible for an agent to lose multiple relationships by declining to perform one favor and
thus can provide enough incentive for an agent to keep performing favors.
One notable issue is that a wide range of equilibria can be supported by a “grim-trigger”
strategy, in which once anyone fails to provide a favor, everyone stops providing favors
forever. These sorts of equilibria are not realistic or desirable, and they can be ruled out
by the definition of renegotiation-proof equilibrium borrowed from Jackson et al. (2012).
People may communicate and renegotiate to avoid the outcome induced by the “grim-
trigger” strategy. In specific, this definition requires that any perpetual continuation after
an agent’s failure to provide a favor must not be Pareto-dominated by another feasible
equilibrium continuation. This captures the credibility of threats to punish uncooperative
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behaviors.
In section 4, I characterize the set of all renegotiation-proof equilibria as a set of
renegotiation-proof networks. I find that while the characterization is similar in methodol-
ogy to Jackson et al. (2012), their result, social quilts, is no longer renegotiation-proof in
my setting. In section 5, I extend the robustness concept in their research to indirect favors
to refine the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria. The level of robustness in Jackson et al.
(2012) is impossible to reach in my setting. In particular, under this specific robustness
refinement, when the allowed length of contact chains is larger than 3, only star-shaped
networks achieve highest robustness. In section 6, I compare networks constructed from
social links to naturally induced kinship networks and show that they are more centralized.
This supports the conclusion in section 5.
1.2. RELATED LITERATURE
The current literature on networks can be roughly divided into two types: exogenous
networks and endogenous networks. The former type focuses on networks that are ex-
ogenously determined, for example, by geological locations. In this stream, applications
of network studies are made on social learning (Bala and Goyal, 1998), crime and social
interaction (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996) and social coordination (Morris,
2000).
This paper falls within the second stream. Such literature mainly focuses on which
networks provide efficiency and stability when agents have the ability to alter the network
structure (form or sever links). Some examples are Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Bala and
Goyal (2000) and Jackson and Watts (2002).
Favor exchange behavior is also studied by literature on social capital. Coleman (1988)
discusses three forms of social capital: obligations, expectations and trust-worthiness of
structures, information channel and norms and effective sanction. However, no game theo-
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retical structure or systematic study of incentives and enforcements is pursued.
Some closely related literature in terms of the theoretical analysis of a repeated game on
a network includes papers that study prisoners’ dilemmas in network settings, such as Raub
and Weesie (1990), Ali and Miller (2009), Lippert and Spagnolo (2011) and Mihm, Toth,
Lang (2009). In particular, Raub and Weesie (1990) and Ali and Miller (2009) show how
completely connected networks shorten the travel time of contagion of bad behavior, which
can quicken punishment for deviations. There are several differences between their study
and mine. In their settings, individuals do not have information about others’ behavior
except through what they observe via their own interactions. Thus, punishments travel
through the network only through contagious behavior, and the main hurdle to enforcing
individual cooperation is how long it takes for someone’s bad behavior to reach his or
her neighbors through chains of contagion. This emphasizes the information diffusing
property of networks. My setting is different in that individuals have complete information
and the network provides a mechanism of sanction. My model focuses on how the network
structure affects individual incentives.
1.3. MODEL
1.3.1 Network, Favors and Payoffs
Consider the setup of Jackson et al (2012). A finite set N = {1,2, ...,n} of agents is
linked in a social network, described by a undirected graph. The set of agents, N, is fixed
throughout my analysis, and a network is represented by the set of links, g. For simplicity,
let i j be the link {i, j} and i j 2 g means that agent i and j are directly linked in the network
g. Let g  i j denote a network obtained from g by deleting the link i j. I define distance
of any i and j as the minimum number of links on a path connecting i and j and denote
the distance as d(i, j). The set of neighbors of an agent i within distance l is denoted by
Nli (g) = { j|d(i, j) l}.
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Time proceeds in discrete periods indexed by t 2 {0,1, ...} (infinitely repeated).
At the beginning of each period, a random draw takes place, where there is a chance of
n(n 1)p< 1 that exactly one favor is needed, and otherwise no favor is needed. If a favor
is needed, then each ordered pair of agents (the first being the provider and the latter being
the recipient) have an equal chance to be assigned this favor. In this setting, the chance that
an agent i needs a favor from an agent j is p and at most one favor may be needed in each
period. Note that p does not depend on the structure of the network. I characterize this
way since the favors I study here are delivered indirectly through the network and the need
for favors does not depend on whether two agents are indirectly connected. For example,
when a job-seeker needs a favor to set up an interview to a specific position, the need for
this favor exists regardless whether this job-seeker is connected to the hiring team.
The following is how my setting and Jackson et al.’s (2012) differ. Agent i and j are
defined as l-connected (indirectly) if there exists a path of links connecting i and j such that
its length is smaller than or equal to l. When a favor is delivered through such a path, the
agent performing the favor pays an amount c of effort, the agent receiving the favor gains
a payoff of v and everyone else incurs no cost nor benefit. I assume that v> c here, which
makes favor exchanging ex post Pareto efficient.
I examine favor exchanges that cannot be self-enforcing. In such cases, contracts may
be too costly to write up or too difficult to be complete and cannot be repaid in monetary
terms. Consider a favor setting up a job interview. It is inappropriate to write up a contract
to enforce returning of this favor or to receive monetary payment. Also, some behaviors
cannot be written into and regulated by contracts. For example, according to Bian (1997),
in 20th-century China, jobs were assigned by government officials. An important type of
favor then was assigning a good job based on personal relationships and connections, which
was illegal and thus cannot be contracted.
Similar to Jackson et al. (2012), agents discount payoffs over time by 0 < d < 1. For
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any agent i and j, in each period, there is a chance of p that i needs a favor from j and a
chance of p that j needs a favor from i. If i and j are l-connected and on the equilibrium
path all favors are performed when needed and no link gets deleted, the payoff of a bilateral
relationship starting from the next period is Â•t=1 d t p(v c) = d p(v c)1 d . If d p(v c)1 d < c, then
an agent may have incentive to decline to perform a favor when called upon because the
benefits from the future do not overcome the cost incurred in the current period. In such
a case, a link is not sustainable if the two agents are in isolation. As shown in the payoff
function, low marginal benefit from each favor and low frequency of interaction leads to
low discounted future payoff. I will only study such cases here since bilaterally enforced
cooperation under this setting would be a trivial and uninteresting case.
A society is described by (N, p,v,c,d ), which will be fixed throughout my analysis.
1.3.2 The Game
The favor exchange game I model is described as follows.
The game begins with an initial network, g0.
Period t begins with network gt 1.
At the beginning of period t, agents simultaneously announce the links they are willing
to keep, Li ⇢ N1i (gt 1), leading to g0t = {i j|i 2 Lj, j 2 Li}. Note that agents cannot form
links but can only choose whether to break existing links.
There is a chance of n(n 1)p that exactly one favor is needed and otherwise no favor
is needed. If a favor is needed, the favor is randomly assigned to any ordered pair of agents
with equal probability. If agent i needs a favor from agent j, and there is no path connecting
i and j with length smaller or equal to l, then this opportunity is lost. Note that I assume
n(n 1)p 1.
If i and j are l-connected, agent i chooses a path with length smaller than or equal to l to
reach out to j and j chooses whether or not to perform the favor. If the favor is performed,
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then j incurs cost c and i gains benefit v. If j declines to perform the favor, j loses its link to
the last member of the path, i.e., the agent that is directly linked to j in the path connecting
i to j. The resulting network is gt .
There are several things to note about this model.
I do not consider the formation of the network but only consider what networks are
sustainable. Agents get to react to other agents’ behavior by dropping links. Since links that
are lost cannot be rebuilt again, this constitutes the sanction against declining to perform
a favor. Essentially, the agents’ strategies are just deciding which links to maintain. This
simplifies the structure of the model and avoids complicated strategies such as punishing
for a finite number of periods and then rebuilding links.
Agents do not pay for each favor in monetary terms. An agent cannot just pay the cost
c to the favor provider. This is consistent with observations in reality. Many favors cannot
be repaid with money. Using the same example as above, assigning a good job costs the
official political capital. Receiving money would be risky and other political favors were a
more realistic way to repay the favor.
This model is a complete information game. This may not seem desirable when the
size of the network is large. I keep it simple to derive more explicit results. However, in
robust equilibria, information does not need to flow through more than l links to enforce
the equilibria.
1.3.3 Equilibrium
Denote Ali(g) = { j| j is l   connected(indirectly) with i}. Any network with c <
|Ali(g)|d p(v c)1 d for all i can be sustained by a so-called “grim-trigger” strategy, in which all
links are kept and all favors are performed on the equilibrium path, and if any agent declines
to perform a favor, all agents drop all links. However many of these equilibria supported by
the “grim-trigger” strategy are not so desirable, because in reality it is extremely unlikely
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for the whole society or even just a group of people to dissolve if one person declines to
do one favor and deletes one link. I borrow from Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan
(2012) the definition of renegotiation-proof equilibrium and renegotiation-proof networks.
The logic behind this equilibrium concept is that when people can communicate, it is more
likely that they would rather reach a Pareto efficient continuation than letting the entire
society collapse. I only consider pure strategies here. Also, I assume that if deleting a link
does not impact an agent’s utility, the agent will delete it. This follows from the logic that
if a link ij can be deleted by i without affecting i’s utility, then when j requests a favor from
i directly, i will decline it and lose the link ij.
Definition [Renegotiation-proof Equilibria]. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are defined
by induction. Denote RPNk to be the set of renegotiation-proof networks (those networks
that are sustained in renegotiation-proof equilibria) with k links. Let Gk denote the set of
networks with k links.
• Let RPN0 = {?}.
• Let RPNk denote the subset of Gk such that g2RPNk iff beginning with g0 = g implies
that there exists a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that
– on the equilibrium path g is always sustained (all favors performed if possible
and all links kept), and
– in any subgame starting with some network g0 2Gk0 with k0 < k, if g00 is reached
with a positive probability and played in perpetuity in the continuation, then
g00 2 RPNk00 for some k00 and there does not exist g000 ⇢ g0 such that g000 2 RPNk000
and have utilities ui(g000)  ui(g00) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
1.4. CHARACTERIZATION OF RENEGOTIATION-PROOF NETWORKS
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The analysis of the network structure essentially depends on how many l-connected
neighbours need to be at stake to incentivize an agent to maintain a link. Let m be an
integer such that (m  1)d p(v c)1 d < c < md p(v c)1 d . Without loss of generality, I use strict
inequality on both sides. As shown in the following section, the parameters d , p, v, c can
be summarized by m and the set of equilibria is determined by n, m and l only.
Here is an example to illustrate renegotiation-proofness of the equilibria.
Figure 1.1 Example: Renegotiation-proof Equilibrium
As shown above, suppose n = 3, m = 2 and l = 3. The network on the left is a
renegotiation-proof equilibrium since if any agent declines a favor and deletes a link, the
rest of the three agents form a two-agent network. Becausem= 2, bilateral relations cannot
be sustained and then the remaining agents will delete the link left. In this way, any agent
who deletes a link will lose 2 l-neighbours. Since m= 2, this will be enough to keep them
from deviating. Thus it is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Now look at the network on the right. The bottom-right agent can delete the link to the
top-right agent and induces a network identical to the one on the left. Since the network
on the left is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium, agents have to follow a continuation that
is not Pareto dominated by it, by the definition of renegotiation-proof equilibria. In this
case, it has to be network on the left itself. Then the bottom-right agent who deletes a link
will lose access to only 1 agent and thus will delete the link when called upon to perform
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a favor for the top-right agent. Therefore the network on the right is not a renegotiation-
proof equilibrium. But note that the network on the right is still a Nash equilibrium with
all agents choosing the “grim trigger” strategy.
In this section, I characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria.
First, I propose a definition of “m-l-critical networks”. Let G(m, l) = {g|8i, |Nli (g)|  
m,or |Nli (g)|= 0}.
Definition [M-L-Critical Network]. A network g is called a m-l-critical network if (i)
g 2 G(m, l); (ii) For any i and i j 2 g, there doesn’t exist g0 ⇢ g  i j such that |Nli (g0)| >
|Nli (g)| m and g0 2 G(m, l).
Proposition 1.1. Any nonempty network g 2 G(m, l) contains a nonempty m-l-critical net-
work.
A detailed proof can be found inAPPENDIX 1. Intuitively, consider a smallest nonempty
network (in the sense of set inclusion) that is a subset of g and lies in G(m, l). Such a net-
work exists (possibly g itself) since g 2 G(m, l) and can be shown to be m-l-critical.
Definition [Transitively m-l-Critical Network]. Transitively m-l-critical networks are
defined as follows. Let Gk denote the set of networks with k links. Given an integer m satis-
fying (m 1)d p(v c)1 d < c< md p(v c)1 d , let TCk(m, l)⇢ Gk denote the set of m-l-transitively
critical networks with k links.
TC0(m, l) = { /0}.
Inductively on k, TCk(m, l)⇢Gk is such that g2 TCk(m, l) if and only if for any i and i j 2 g,
there exists g0 ⇢ g  i j such that g0 2 TCk0(m, l) for some k0 < k, |Nli (g0)|  |Nli (g)| m,
and there is no g00 2 TCk00(m, l) such that g00 ⇢ g  i j and |Nl(g00)|> |Nl(g0)|.
A network g is transitively m-l-critical if when some link ij of i’s is deleted, then the
next largest transitively m-l-critical network that is a subset of g  i j involves i losing access
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to at least m  1 more agents. Note that this definition doesn’t involve any incentive, but
only the structure of the networks themselves. This can be seen as an algorithm to find all
the renegotiation-proof equilibria, as I will show next in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1.1. A network is renegotiation-proof if and only if it is transitively m-l-critical.
This theorem transforms the problem of incentives to a problem of the network structure
and essentially can be used as an algorithm to find all renegotiation-proof networks. A
detailed proof can be found in APPENDIX 1. The theorem is proved by induction on the
number of links in the network.
1.5. ROBUSTNESS
Renegotiation-proofness requires that when an agent deletes a link, the network doesn’t
totally collapse to an empty network, unless it is small enough. In addition, a network is
considered more robust if the consequences of link deletion is contained in a smaller range.
Here I propose a robustness concept, which is an extension to the robustness concept in
Jackson et al (2012).
Definition [Robust to Degree r]. A network g is robust to degree r, if and only if it is
renegotiation-proof and sustained as part of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium
beginning with g0 = g such that in any subgame continuation from any renegotiation-proof
g0 ⇢ g, and for any i and i j 2 g0, if i declines a favor when called upon and then ij is deleted
and g00 ⇢ g0   i j is reached with positive probability and then played in perpetuity in the
continuation, then if i0 j0 2 g0 but i0 j0 /2 g00 then i0, j0 2 Nri (g0)[{i}.
In words, in a network that is robust to degree r or any of its renegotiation-proof sub-
networks, if an agent i declines a favor when called upon and a link ij is deleted, further
deletion must be contained among i and i’s r-neighbours.
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One matter to note here is that, the robust equilibrium in Jackson et al (2012), the
social quilts, are no long renegotiation-proof networks here, though under certain condi-
tions, similar structures (decentralized union of centralized small groups) may be found
renegotiation-proof in this setting too. Their robustness requirement is actually robust to
degree 1 in my setting and it cannot be achieved with l > 1.
Proposition 1.2. Any network cannot be robust to degree 1 if l > 1.
A detailed proof can be found in APPENDIX 1. Intuitively this follows as robust to
degree 1 requires a fully pairwise linked subnetwork which is never renegotiation-proof
when l > 1.
Hence, for l > 1, robust to degree 2 is the highest robustness possible. Actually, robust
to degree 2 can be achieved for any l by star networks characterized below.
Definition [Star Network]. A network g is called a star network if there exists an node i
such that i is linked with all other agents and no other links exist.
Denote a star network of size s with SN(s). It is easy to see that a star network of size
mt+1 for some integer t is robust to degree 2 for any l > 1 (by simple induction on t).
Theorem 1.2. For l   4, a network g is renegotiation-proof and robust to degree 2 if and
only if g is SN(mt+1) for some integer t.
A detailed proof can be found in APPENDIX 1. This theorem is proved by induction
on the size of the population. The key intuition here is that a network cannot be robust to
degree 2 if any two nodes are not within a distance of 2.
The star networks, when l   4, are the only networks that are robust to degree 2. Also
note that in a star network, all favors, between whichever two agents, are performed and
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thus the society achieves maximum social welfare. While the whole society being orga-
nized into a star network may seem unrealistic, note that this result is derived given the
assumption of complete information. It is plausible to assume that for groups that are
“small” enough for in-time and efficient information sharing, a star network is an efficient
and robust structure. In addition, this network structure is derived based on the need for
favor exchange while real networks serve various purposes such as information sharing, en-
tertainment and companionship and thus may have different structures. In Bala and Goyal
(2000), they find that in the two-way case (undirected graph), limiting networks with local
learning converge to either empty or center-sponsored star network. This result is consis-
tent with my finding here. The main takeaway here is that a centralized network structure
offers the most efficiency and robustness to sustain favor exchange.
1.6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section, I explore the data used by Jackson et al (2012). The data is collected
from 75 Indian rural villages through questionnaires in a microfinance program. Here I
focus on two metrics of the networks: the assortativity coefficients (henceforth denoted
AC) and support levels of the networks.
The assortativity coefficient measures the preference of nodes in a network to be linked
with other nodes of similar degrees. The assortativity coefficient is the Pearson correlation
coefficient of degree between pairs of linked nodes and it is given by r = Â jk jk(e jk q jqk)s2q ,
where q j is the distribution of the remaining degree (degree minus one) of each vertex j and
e jk is the joint probability distribution of the remaining degrees of the two vertices, j and
k. The assortativity coefficient ranges from -1 (disassortative, i.e., high degree nodes tend
to link with low degree nodes) to 1 (assortative, i.e., high degree nodes tend to link with
high degree nodes). A social quilt based on Jackson et al (2012) has a positive assortativity
coefficient and a star network has assortativity coefficient equal to -1.
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A link ij in a network is called supported if there exist another node k which is a
neighbour of both i and j. The support level of a network is the ratio of the number of
supported links to the number of all links. This measure is introduced in Jackson et al
(2012). A social quilt based on Jackson et al (2012) has a support level of 1 and a star
network has a support level of 0.
Note that the dataset only contains information of approximately half of the households
in each village. This may bias both measures and the direction of bias is unknown.
Here I define the links in the data. There are 11 different relationships surveyed in
the data and I define five types of links based on those. The 11 relationships are listed as
follows: borrowing money (henceforth denoted M1), lending money (M2), borrowing rice
(F1), lending rice (F2), giving advice (A1), receiving advice (A2), visiting (V1), getting
visits (V2), getting medical help (ME), going to temple together (T) and being related (R).
I define five types of links as shown in Table 1 below.
Link Type Denotation Description
Relative R R
Social S M1[M2[F1[F2[A1[A2[V1[V2[ME [T
Strict Social SS (M1\M2)[ (F1\F2)[ (A1\A2)[ (V1\V2)[ME [T
Union U S[R
Strict Union SU SS[R
Table 1.1 Link Types
Social links refer to the links that are solely based on social interaction while Union
links refer to ones based on either social interaction or kinship. Strict links refer to the
links that are reciprocal while non-strict links refer to both reciprocal and non-reciprocal
links. The links studied in my model fit the definition of non-strict links since agents
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don’t necessarily reciprocate favors bilaterally. But the strict links, which are similar to the
link definition used in Jackson et al (2012), have the advantage of reducing measurement
error, since some villagers may be mistaken about the relationships they have with another
villagers.
While I find that all village networks have positive assortativity coefficients and high
support levels for all these link types, I argue that the reason is that these networks are
largely dominated by the kinship relation. Table 1.2 shows the probability of a link of type
S or SS exists for a related pair of agents compared to a unrelated pair. Related agents
are far more likely to have a link of type S or SS than unrelated agents. Related agents
have more frequent interactions with each other and likely engage in risk sharing and even
property sharing and etc beyond favor exchange. The kinship networks demonstrate large
positive assortativity coefficients (average of 0.688 and median of 0.667) and high support
levels (average of 0.9605 and median of 0.9611). It is impossible to retrieve a network that
is purely built for social favor exchange and all the networks’ assortativity coefficient and
support levels are greatly skewed towards 1.
Link Type S SS
Related Agents 92.3% 90.4%
Non-related Agents 0.25% 0.16%
Table 1.2 Probability of Link for Related/Non-related Agents
For groups of larger scale, limitation of information sharing may also be a reason pre-
venting structures like star networks from emerging. For example, if two parts of a net-
works have no or little information flow, then they actually can be considered separate and
structures like star networks can emerge in the separate subnetworks. While exact star net-
works may seem unlikely to be present in reality, the essential characteristics that make star
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networks the most efficient and robust structure to sustain favor exchange with the mini-
mum number of links are that low-degree nodes are connected through high degree nodes
(negative assortativity) and that few small loops exist (low support level). From here I pre-
dict that social links will skew networks’ assortativity coefficient towards -1 and support
levels towards 0.
Hypothesis 1. All the networks constructed by social links have lower assortativity
coefficients than the networks induced by the kinship links. In other words, favor-related
links skew the network’s assortativity measure towards -1.
Table 1.3 shows the average and median of the assortativity coefficient of the kinship
network and each of the four types of networks.
Link Type R S SS U SU
Average #Links 2620.4 3587 3095.2 3784.9 3347.5
Mean AC 0.6880 0.3732 0.4846 0.3560 0.4302
Median AC 0.6666 0.3556 0.4628 0.3425 0.3966
Standard Deviation 0.1250 0.0884 0.1292 0.0782 0.1155
Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics of Assortativity Coefficients
Table 1.3 shows that networks of links S, SS, U and SU demonstrate lower assortativity
coefficients than R. Furthermore, this is true for each of the 75 villages for S, SS, U and
SU.
Notice that the R networks have less links than the others. Amongst all the R networks,
the correlation coefficient of assortativity coefficients and link counts is positive at 0.5923.
Therefore the difference of assortativity is not simply due to the difference in number of
links.
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Table 1.4 shows the regression results of assortativity coefficients on the number of
villagers, the number of links and subsets of dummy variables for S, SS, U and SU , with
fixed effect for each village.
#Villagers #Links S SS U SU
I 0.0637⇤⇤  0.0524⇤⇤  0.2641⇤⇤  0.1785⇤⇤  0.2710⇤⇤  0.2197⇤⇤
(0.0047) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0174) (0.0124)
II 0.0683⇤⇤ 0.0656⇤⇤  0.2513⇤⇤  0.1722⇤⇤ - -
(0.0075) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0131) - -
III 0.0623⇤⇤  0.0485⇤⇤ - -  0.2754⇤⇤  0.2225⇤⇤
(0.0063) (0.0177) - - (0.0223) (0.0155)
(**: significant at 99% confidence)
Table 1.4 Regression Results for Assortativity Coefficients
As shown in Table 1.4 above, each of the dummy variables has a negative regression
coefficient with 99% significance.
Hypothesis II. All the networks constructed by the social links have lower support
levels than the networks induced by the kinship links. In other words, favor-related links
skew the network’s support level towards 0.
Table 1.5 shows the average and median of the support levels of kinship networks and
each of the four types of networks.
Link Type R S SS U SU
Average #Links 2620.4 3587 3095.2 3784.9 3347.5
Mean 0.9605 0.9069 0.8923 0.9170 0.9080
Median 0.9611 0.9074 0.8939 0.9169 0.9071
Standard Deviation 0.0140 0.0182 0.0195 0.0172 0.0170
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Table 1.5 Descriptive Statistics of Support Level
Table 1.5 above shows that networks of links S, SS, U and SU demonstrate lower
support levels than R. In particular, this is true for each of the 75 villages for S and U and
74 out of 75 for SS and SU.
Again the R networks have less links than the others. Amongst all the R networks, the
correlation coefficient of support levels and link numbers is positive at 0.4131. Therefore
the difference of support level is not simply due to the difference in number of links.
Table 1.6 shows regressions of support levels on number of villagers, number of links
and subsets of dummy variables for S, SS, U and SU, with fixed effect for each village.
#Villagers #Links S SS U SU
I 0.0567⇤⇤  0.0061⇤⇤  0.0476⇤⇤  0.0653⇤⇤  0.0363⇤⇤  0.0480⇤⇤
(0.0009) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0024)
II 0.0584⇤⇤  0.0113⇤⇤  0.0426⇤⇤  0.0628⇤⇤ - -
(0.0015) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0028) - -
III 0.0584⇤⇤  0.0110⇤⇤ - -  0.0307⇤⇤  0.0445⇤⇤
(0.0011) (0.0030) - - (0.0038) (0.0026)
(**: significant at 99% confidence)
Table 1.6 Regression Results for Support Level
As shown in Table 1.6 above, each of the dummy variables has a negative regression
coefficient with 99% significance. Therefore social networks, both with and without kin-
ship links, demonstrate lower assortativity coefficients and support levels than the kinship
networks.
1.7. CONCLUSIONS
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In this paper I extend Jackson et al’s model by allowing agents to seek favor indirectly
through a chain of contacts. While the algorithm for finding renegotiation-proof equilibria
remains analogous, the resulting renegotiation-proof equilibria class becomes vastly differ-
ent. Social quilts are no longer renegotiation-proof networks and their robustness criteria
(robust to degree 1) is not feasible for any l > 1.
In this setting, instead, star networks achieve the highest level of robustness (most ro-
bust) and full efficiency. This is consistent with results from Bala and Goyal (2000) and
also matches some observation of groups of relatively small sizes. As for groups of larger
scale, limitation of information sharing may be a reason preventing such structure from
emerging. My empirical analysis shows that networks consisting of social links are more
centralized than kinship networks.
Meanwhile, other refinement criteria may lead to other interesting and tractable struc-
ture. Equilibria with information restriction may look different as well. The implication of
relaxing these assumptions and refinements calls for future investigations.
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CHAPTER 2. PAYOFF-IRRELEVANT TRAITS IN ASYMMETRIC
COORDINATION GAMES
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Traits that are irrelevant to people’s capabilities are often present in everyday life, from
physical traits like gender, race, appearance and height to personality traits like introversion
and extroversion to social traits like professional affiliations, political groups and religious
groups. It is also often observed that people with different traits are treated differently on
matters that are unrelated to those traits, and as a result, discrimination and segregation
can occur. In this paper, I study traits that are public information. The scope of such traits
is not limited to the ones just mentioned or the ones often referred to in the context of
discrimination. For example, whether a person prefers chocolate cake to strawberry cake
can as well be a public trait. This study shows that there can be a payoff-driven cause
for discriminatory treatments based on these payoff-irrelevant public traits, and this might
require extra effort to remedy.
McAdams (1995) explores various theories to explain David Hume’s observation that
"[w]hen men are once inlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons
with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions
they often transmit to their posterity." McAdams (1995) presents various experiment re-
sults that support the presence of this behavior. In particular, Schopler et al. (1991) shows
that when assigned to purely experimental groups that do not affect their payoffs, subjects
demonstrate more competitive and less cooperative inter-group behavior than intra-group
behavior. On average, 8.73 defections occur in 20 rounds of inter-group prisoner’s dilemma
games, and 1.8 defections occur out of 20 rounds without group assignment. Instead of
studying the individual incentive of such behavior, my paper examines the collective out-
come and evolution of myopic players.
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This paper establishes an evolutionary game theoretical model to find the driving force
of such behavior. The methods applied in this paper are based on Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1999) (henceforth KMR). KMR show that without such traits, in the long run equilibrium,
all players coordinate on the risk dominant action. I find that discriminatory behavior
may increase efficiency within a certain population, but from a broader perspective, it may
result in loss of efficiency. One prediction from my models is that segregation may well
result from this behavior. Pascal (1965) studies the driving force of racial segregation
in Chicago and Detroit and shows empirical evidence that social-economic factors only
explain approximately half of the variations of non-white sub-area residence proportion
and “attitudinal” factors are prominent to explain racial segregation. This paper shows that
under certain conditions, segregation is an inherent outcome of population evolution.
I adopt an evolutionary setting with discrete time and a deterministic update rule. In
each period, the population is updated according to the payoffs based on a deterministic
update rule and then each player has a chance to mutate. I study the dynamics under the
two scenarios. The first scenario is discussed in section 2. I consider each node of the
population as a position in the population, such as a job in a company or a household in an
community. Then any change to a node can be considered as the original player at this node
being replaced by a new one, and the total number of players of each trait is dynamic. In
section 3, I characterize the set of long run equilibria under certain assumptions and show
that in the majority of this set, one trait is eliminated from the population. In section 4, I
consider an alternative setting in which each node of the population represents an player.
Also in order to address the question “Where do the replaced players go?”, I add a second
and inferior location in this setting. Any change to a node can be considered the player
changing his or her behavior or location. In this setting, players are not replaced, and the
total number of players of each trait is fixed. I show that there exists a weakly Darwinian
update rule such that the set of long run equilibria is the set of separating equilibria where
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the traits are segregated into the two locations, while there is no limit of each location’s
population size, which results in inefficiency.
2.2. POPULATION DYNAMICS WITH REPLACEMENT
In this section, I introduce a model in which traits are not fixed. A group of N players,
who each has an observable trait, taking value in {0,1}, is repeatedly matched to play a
2-by-2 asymmetric coordination game as follows, where {x,y} is the set of actions feasible
and a > b, d > c, a > d, d > b. In other words, it is better for the players to match their
actions but matching on x is better than matching on y. Here the players are all myopic,
i.e., they always choose their actions solely based on the trait of their opponents without
considering the payoffs.
x y
x a, a c, b
y b, c d, d
Figure 2.1 Asymmetric Coordination Game
The set of pure strategies is {xx,xy,yx,yy} where xy, for example, means taking action
x if the player is matched with a player of trait 0 and taking action y if the player is matched
with a player of trait 1.Based on strategies and traits, the population can be divided into
eight groups:
G= {xx0,xy0,yx0,yy0,xx1,xy1,yx1,yy1}
where, for example, xy0 denotes the group of players that carry out strategy xy and have
trait 0. The action a player takes when facing an opponent of the same trait is called his or
her intra-trait action and similarly the action a player takes when facing an opponent of the
other trait is called his or her inter-trait action.
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Actions are taken at discrete time t = 1,2, .... Let z(t) 2N8 be the vector of the sizes of
the eight groups at the beginning of period t.
Let
|z|1 = Â
g2G
|zg|
be the L1 norm of a vector z, i.e., the sum of the absolute values of all entries of a vector.
Then any z(t) lies in the state space
Z = {z 2 N8 : |z|1 = N}.
As in KMR, a tournament takes place at the beginning of each period, in which each
player is matched with every player (including with self) in the population exactly once.
Notice that each player in a nonempty group receives the same payoffs. Let the payoff of
a nonempty group be the average payoff from all N interactions of a representative player
in that group. Formally, let ug(g0) for all g,g0 2 G be the payoff that a player in group g
receives when he or she is matched with a player from group g0. The total payoff of a player
in a nonempty group g at a state z(t) is Âg02Gug(g0)zg0(t) and he or she receives an average
payoff of 1N Âg02Gug(g
0)zg0(t).
Then the payoff of a nonempty group g at a state z(t) is given by
Ug(z(t)) =
1
N Âg02G
ug(g0)zg0(t).
The payoff of an empty group is the average payoffs that would be received if there
was one member in that group. Then the total payoff this counterfactual player receives
from all N+1 interactions (N interactions with the current population and one with self) is
ug(g)+Âg02Gug(g0)zg0(t) and his or her average payoff is 1N+1(ug(g)+Âg02Gug(g
0)zg0(t)).
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Then the payoff of an empty group g at a state z(t) is given by
Ug(z(t)) =
1
N+1
(ug(g)+ Â
g02G
ug(g0)zg0(t)).
Together the payoff of any group g at a state z(t) is given by
Ug(z(t)) =
8>><>>:
1
N Âg02Gug(g
0)zg0(t) i f zg > 0
1
N+1(ug(g)+Âg02Gug(g
0)zg0(t)) i f zg = 0
.
The payoffs are set up this way so that the payoffs, in some sense, respond ’continu-
ously’ to changes of the population and do not jump to zero when the group size becomes
zero.
Note that this model may apply to any group of people with tight intra-group interac-
tions. In fact, this model is better applied to somewhat smaller groups, such as companies
and communities, as opposed to large groups such as the society since smaller groups
evolve much faster and their interactions may be more uniformly distributed. In a very
large group such as a city or a country, interactions are likely more localized due to geo-
logical limitations and then the geological distribution of players may greatly influence the
population dynamics.
In each period, after the payoffs are realized, the population is adjusted via evolution in
which groups yielding better payoff gain more resources and grow in size and groups yield-
ing worse payoffs gain less resources and shrink in size. The dynamics of this adjustment
is characterized by a deterministic update rule,
b : Z! Z.
The sizes of the eight groups are adjusted according to b(·) and the population starting
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at z(t) becomes b(z(t)). Note that payoffsUg(z(t)),g 2 G are functions of the state vector.
Letting b(·) be a function of the current population state allows the update to not only
depend on the payoffs of the groups but also on the current population distribution. Note
that in this setting both strategies and traits can change via update. The payoff setting
allows groups with advantages to arise from zero size solely via these adjustment updates.
A state z 2 Z is called a steady state if
b(z) = z.
Like in KMR, I impose certain restrictions on steady states.
Definition [Payoff Steady]. A state z 2 Z is payoff steady if
8g,g0 2 G, Ug(z) =Ug0(z) i f zg > 0,zg0 > 0
and 8g,g0 2 G, Ug(z) Ug0(z) i f zg > 0,zg0 = 0.
A state z is payoff steady if all nonempty groups in z have the same payoff which is
larger than or equal to the payoffs of the empty groups. This is analogous to the assumption
on steady states in KMR.
Assumption. (2.1) A state z 2 Z is a steady state, i.e., b(z) = z, iff z is payoff steady.
In each period, after the update takes place, mutations take place at a certain probability
e to each player. Each mutated player becomes a member of a random group with equal
probabilities. As mentioned, an adjustment or mutation to a player can be considered as
replacing the original player with a new one.
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Let bg(z(t)) denote the size of group g at b(z(t)). Let yg(t) denote the number of players
in group g that are mutated in period t. Then yg(t) have the following distribution:
yg(t)⇠ Binomial(bg(z(t)),e).
Write y(t) = (yxx0(t),yxy0(t), ...,yyy1(t)). A total of Âg2G yg(t) players are mutated in
period t. When a player mutates, he or she becomes a member of one of the eight groups
with equal probabilities. Let xg(t) be the number of players that become a member of group
g among the Âg2G yg(t)mutated players and write x(t) = (xxx0(t),xxy0(t), ...,xyy1(t)). Then
x(t) is given by
x(t)⇠Multinomial(Â
g2G
yg(t),(
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
)).
Together the overall change to the population from mutation is x(t)  y(t).
Then this procedure yields the following nonlinear stochastic equation
z(t+1) = b(z(t))+ x(t)  y(t).
Let’s look at a simplified example of a 5-player population. Suppose that the population
starts from z(t) = (3,0,2,0,0,0,0,0) at the beginning of time t. First, the update takes
place and suppose that during the update, one member of yy0 becomes a member of xx0.
Then population becomes b((3,0,2,0,0,0,0,0)) = (4,0,1,0,0,0,0,0). Now let’s look at
mutations. Suppose that mutations occur to one member of xx0 and one member of yy0.
Then yxx0(t) = yyx0(t) = 1 is realized and y(t) = (1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0). Here 2 mutations
take place. Then suppose that both mutated players become members of xx1 and x(t) =
(0,0,0,0,2,0,0,0) is realized.
Now the population entering period t+1 is
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z(t+1) = b(z(t))+ x(t)  y(t)
= (4,0,1,0,0,0,0,0)+(0,0,0,0,2,0,0,0)  (1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) = (3,0,0,0,2,0,0,0)
The dynamic system described by this stochastic equation defines a Markov chain on
Z.
The transition probabilities are functions of the mutation rate e and are given by
pzi,z j(e) = Prob(z(t+1) = z j|z(t) = zi).
The Markov matrix is
P(e) = (pzi,z j(e)).
Note that the transition probabilities and the Markov matrix depend on the mutation
probability, e .
A stationary distribution is defined as a vector µ(e) 2 {q 2 R|Z|+ : qz   0,Âz2Z qz = 1}
such that
µ(e) = µ(e)P(e).
Since it is possible to mutate from any state to any other state in Z, all pzi,z j(e)’s are
positive and P(e) is a positive matrix. The Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic. As
shown in KMR, when P(e) is a positive matrix, the Markov chain has a unique stationary
distribution, denoted as µ(e).
Here I refer to the definition of the limit distribution from KMR.
Definition [Limit Distribution]. The limit distribution µ⇤ is defined by
µ⇤ = lime!0µ(e)
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if it exists. The set of long run equilibria is defined as
C = {z 2 Z : µ⇤z > 0}.
The set of long run equilibria is the set of states that have a positive probability in the
limit distribution. Since it is too complicated to explicitly solve µ(e)P(e) = µ(e) and then
calculate the limit of µ(e), I utilize the method from Freidlin and Wenzell (1984), which
is also used in KMR. I first define several key concepts and then introduce the key theorem
from KMR.
Definition [z-tree]. A z-tree h of a state z 2 Z is a collection of ordered pairs of (or arrows
between) elements of Z, denoted as (zi ! z j), such that every state in Z\{z} is the initial
point of exactly one arrow and from any state in Z\{z} there is a sequence of arrows
leading to z. Let the set of all such z-trees of z be Hz.
For any real valued functions f and g, say f (e) = O(g(e)) as e ! 0 iff there exist
positive real numbersM and e0 such that
| f (e)|Mg(e) f or all |e|< e0.
Definition [Cost Function]. The cost of an arrow from z to z0 for any z,z0 2 Z, denoted
cz,z0 2 R+, is defined as the speed of pz,z0(e) converging to zero as e tends to zero, i.e.,
cz,z0 = max{c : pz,z0(e) = O(ec) as e ! 0}.
Let the cost from a state z0 to a set of states B be the minimum sum of costs of a sequence
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of arrows zi! zi+1, i= 0,1, ...,k 1 from z0 to a state zk in B, denoted as
cz0,B = minzi2Z,zk2B{
k 1
Â
i=0
czi,zi+1}.
Let the cost of a z-tree h be the sum of the costs of all the arrows in h, i.e.,
c(h) = Â
(zi!z j)2h
czi,z j .
The minimal cost of a z-tree of a state z is called the transition cost of z and is given by
vz = minh2Hz{c(h)}.
KMR proves the following theorem. Their paper focuses on an one-dimensional state
space but their proof of this theorem applies to any finite state space Z with a positive
Markov matrix P(e)> 0, which subsumes my setting.
Theorem 2.1. The set of long run equilibria is characterized by
C = Argminz2Zvz.
This theorem states that the set of long run equilibria is the set of states with the smallest
transition cost. Now to characterize the set of long run equilibria. I focus on finding states
with the smallest transition cost.
Now I characterize the set of long run equilibria in my model, with certain assumptions
on the update rule b(·) and the payoff parameters.
First I assume that the population does not enter a loop via update. Let bk(·) be the
29
k-fold product of function b(·).
Assumption. (2.2) For any state z 2 Z, the limit limk!•bk(z) exists and is a steady state.
Then I require the update rule to be in a sense ’Darwinian’ and efficient. Let MU(z) =
argmaxg02G{Ug0(z)} denote the groups with the maximum payoff in a state z.
Assumption. (2.3) A group grows in size, i.e., bg(z) > zg only if g 2 MU(z). For all
g /2MU(z), I have bg(z)< zg if zg > 0.
Assumption (2.3) requires that only the groups with the best payoff may grow in size
and any group with worse payoffs must shrink in size.
Denote
I1 = {z : zxx0+ zxy0 = N}[{z : zxx0+ zxx1 = N}[{z : zyx1+ zxx1 = N}.
At any state in {z : zxx0+ zxy0 = N}, all players have trait 0 and choose x as their intra-
trait action. At any state in {z : zxx0+ zxx1 = N}, both traits exist and all players choose x as
their intra-trait action and inter-trait action. At any state in {z : zyx1+ zxx1 = N}, all players
have trait 1 and choose x as their intra-trait action. In any state in I1, each player will
always play x whoever he or she is matched with and receive payoff a, which is the highest
payoff possible. In any other states, there are always players receiving payoffs smaller than
a. Therefore I1 is the set of Pareto efficient steady states.
Denote
I2 = {z : zyx0 = zxy1 = N2 }.
At the state in I2, exactly half of the population has trait 0, and the other half has trait 1.
All players choose y as their intra-trait action and x as their inter-trait action. All players
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receive payoff a+d2 .
Theorem 2.2. If Assumption (2.1) to (2.3) are satisfied, then for large enough N and
almost all a ca d 2 R++,
C 2 {I1, I2, I1[ I2}.
Here I provide a brief outline of the proof.
First, I show that a state cannot be a long run equilibrium if it is not a steady state.
Then I show that for any two steady states in I1, they have the same transition cost.
Third I show that for any z-tree of any steady state outside I1 [ I2, I can find a z-tree
of some state in I1 with a lower cost. This shows that any steady state that is not in I1[ I2
has a higher transition cost than a state in I1. Theorem 2.1 states that the set of long run
equilibria is the set of states with the smallest transition cost. Then any steady state outside
I1[ I2 is not a long run equilibrium. Since C is nonempty and any two steady states in I1
have the same transition cost, I haveC 2 {I1, I2, I1[ I2}.
Note that this methodology is similar to what is used by KMR but due to the difference
in the state spaces (seven dimensional here vs one dimensional in KMR), more complicated
analysis is involved here.
A detailed proof is available in APPENDIX 2B.
In the seven dimensional state space, there exist many steady states, such as the state
in I2, in which the payoffs are delicately balanced and the absence of any player from the
tournament of interactions will cause the population to stop being payoff steady. Therefore
I introduce a robustness condition to exclude these steady states and require the steady
states to be robust to some minor disturbances in the population interactions. Note that
this disturbance is not the same as mutations, as mutations are disturbances to players’
strategies and traits.
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Definition [Absence Robust]. A state z is absence robust if z is a payoff steady state and
for any player, the resulting state with this player excluded is also payoff steady.
Note that in KMR, the long run equilibria under their model setting are absence robust
as well.
I assume that a steady state must satisfy both of these conditions.
Assumption. (2.4) A state z 2 Z is a steady state, i.e., b(z) = z, iff z is absence robust.
Under the this assumption, the set of long run equilibria is further refined.
Theorem 2.3. If Assumption (2.2) to (2.4) are satisfied, then for large enough N,
C = I1.
The proof for this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2, and a detailed proof
can be found in APPENDIX 2B.
Theorem 2.3 states that the set of long run equilibria is the set of Pareto efficient steady
states. Notice that both traits are populated only in the subset {z : zxx0+ zxx1 = N}. In all
other long run equilibria, only one trait is populated. In reality, this can be represented by,
for example, groups and organizations eventually sharing the same political opinions, dress
code or even race (people of different races are edged out and replaced).
Also notice that in the long run equilibria, whenever players of both traits coexist, they
must both choose x as their inter-trait action. Consider a state in which group xy0 has a
positive size and there are also players of trait 1. Then one of these two groups must have
a lower payoff and this cannot be a steady state. Subsequent updates will either edge out
one trait or edge out the players with discriminatory behaviors.
Another matter to note about this result is that the concept ’long run equilibria’ does
not imply that after a long time, the population will land and stay there but instead means
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that these equilibria are more robust to mutations than other steady states. Whenever e > 0,
every steady state has a positive probability in the corresponding stationary distribution
µ(e), however small it may be.
For example, consider a state z 2 {z : zxx0+ zxy0 = N}. At z, no players of trait 1 exist.
In actual dynamics however, players of trait 1 can arise from mutations and then are edged
out and eliminated. A large number of mutations can also drive the population from z into
another steady state, including steady states that are not long run equilibria.
Note that in KMR, without the presence of traits, in the long run equilibrium all players
coordinate on the risk dominant action, which is not Pareto efficient when a  b > d  c.
Under my setting, the set of long run equilibria is always Pareto efficient. Even though
the existence of payoff-irrelevant traits may lead to efficiency, one trait can be completely
eliminated from the population.
One intuition behind this difference is that even though traits are payoff-irrelevant, they
can serve as a coordination device and allows a subset of the population to coordinate
without changing their response to the rest of the population. For example, in a state where
everyone is of trait 0 and coordinates on y regardless the opponent’s trait, players of trait 1
can arise by coordinating on y with the players of trait 0 and meanwhile coordinating on x
among themselves thus achieving a higher payoff.
Furthermore, even though the complete elimination of one trait is not often observed
in reality, the following factors may explain the difference and the model is still a good
approximation. First, the model assumes that each period each player is matched with
each player in the population exactly once. This level of uniformly distributed interaction
may not be most realistic. In reality, interactions are usually more localized. For example,
in a community, neighbours tend to interact more than others. This may allow players
with the minority trait to still exist in a population with discriminatory behaviors. Second,
when the update is slow and each period corresponds to a decently long time in reality,
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what we observe is often not the long run equilibria but rather intermediate states in the
population dynamics. Take a community as an example again, it could take a household
months or even years to move out of a unfriendly neighborhood due to various reasons such
as financial concerns. Lastly, the model does not track the players that leave the population.
In reality for example, when a worker leaves a company, he or she will end up at another
company and the scope of population can affect the observation from reality. In Section
2.3, I discuss an alternative setting that addresses this aspect of dynamics.
2.3. POPULATION DYNAMICS WITHOUT REPLACEMENT
In this section, I introduce a variation of the model. Here mutations and adjustments
can be considered as players experimenting and adapting their strategies.
A group of 2N players resides at two locations, {H,L}, among which N players have
trait 0 and the other N players have trait 1. Let zg,l,g 2 G, l 2 {H,L} denote the number of
players in group g at location l. LetG0 = {xx0,xy0,yx0,yy0} andG1 = {xx1,xy1,yx1,yy1}.
The state space here is
Z0 = {z 2 N16 : Â
g2G0,l2{H,L}
zg,l = Â
g2G1,l2{H,L}
zg,l = N}.
At the beginning of each period, a tournament takes place at each location. A player is
matched with each of the players at the same location for exactly once, to play the same
asymmetric coordination as described above. The payoff of a group at a certain location
is the average payoff of a representative player of that group at that location. The payoff
calculation is similar to the previous setting in Section 2.2 at each location except for that
the payoffs of all groups at location L are discounted by d . Formally, the payoff of a group
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g 2 G at location l 2 {H,L} in a state z(t) is given by
Ug,l(z(t)) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1
Âg3G zg0,l(t)
Âg02Gug(g0)zg0,l(t) i f zg,l > 0, l = H
1
Âg3G zg0,l(t)+1
(ug(g)+Âg02Gug(g0)zg0,l(t)) i f zg,l = 0, l = H
d
Âg3G zg0,l(t)
Âg02Gug(g0)zg0,l(t) i f zg,l > 0, l = L
d
Âg3G zg0,l(t)+1
(ug(g)+Âg02Gug(g0)zg0,l(t)) i f zg,l = 0, l = L
.
In each period, adjustment and mutation occur to players’ strategies and locations in a
similar same fashion as in Section 2.2 but not to their traits.
Similar to the previous setting, in each period, after the payoffs are realized, the pop-
ulation is adjusted and the dynamics of this adjustment is characterized by a deterministic
update rule,
b : Z0 ! Z0.
The condition for steady states is slightly different. Here I assume b(z) = z only if for
each trait, all nonempty groups at either location in z have the same payoff which is larger
than or equal to the payoffs of the empty groups at either location.
In this setting, the definition of payoff steady states is slightly modified to incorporate
locations and the fact that traits do not change.
Definition [Payoff Steady]. A state z 2 Z0 is payoff steady if
8i 2 {0,1},g,g0 2 Gi, l, l0 2 {H,L}, Ug,l(z) =Ug0,l0(z) i f zg,l > 0,zg0,l0 > 0
8i 2 {0,1},g,g0 2 Gi, l, l0 2 {H,L}, Ug,l(z) Ug0,l0(z) i f zg,l > 0,zg0,l0 = 0.
The definition of absence robust remains the same. Similarly, I require a steady state
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z 2 Z0 to be both payoff steady and absence robust.
Assumption. (2.5) A state z 2 Z0 is a steady state, i.e., b(z) = z, iff z is absence robust.
In each period, after the update takes place, mutations take place at a certain probability
e to each player. Each mutated player of trait i becomes a member of a random group in
Gi at either location with equal probabilities. As mentioned, an adjustment or mutation to
a player can be considered as the original player changing his or her strategy of actions and
location.
Let yg,l(t) denote the number of players in group g at location l that are mutated at time
t. Let bg,l(z(t)) denote the size of group g at location l at b(z(t)). Then yg,l(t) have the
following distribution:
yg,l(t)⇠ Binomial(bg,l(z(t)),e).
A total of Âg2G0,l2{H,L} yg,l(t) players of trait 0 and a total of Âg2G1,l2{H,L} yg,l(t) play-
ers of trait 1 are mutated at time t. Let xg,l(t) be the number of players that become a
member of group g at location l among the Âg2G,l2{H,L} yg,l(t) mutated players and for
i= 1,2 write
xi(t) = (xxxi,H(t),xxyi,H(t),xyxi,H(t),xyyi,H(t),xxxi,L(t),xxyi,L(t),xyxi,L(t),xyyi,L(t)).
Players’ traits do not change during mutations. Then xi(t) is given by
xi(t)⇠Multinomial( Â
g2Gi,l2{H,L}
yg,l(t),(
1
8
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1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
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1
8
)).
Then the population dynamics is characterized by the set of nonlinear stochastic equa-
tions
zg,l(t+1) = bg,l(z(t))+ xg,l(t)  yg,l(t).
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This also defines a Markov chain on Z0 with a positive Markov matrix since it is possible
to mutate from any state z 2 Z0 to any z0 2 Z0. Theorem 2.1 also applies to this setting.
Definition. An update rule b : Z0 ! Z0 is defined as Weakly Darwinian if under this update
rule, whenever a group increases in size then all groups with higher or equal payoffs do
not decrease in size and whenever a group decreases in size then all groups with lower or
equal payoff do not increase in size.
This is a relaxed condition of Assumption (2.2).
Theorem 2.4. If Assumption (2.4) is satisfied, and ab b2 bc+bd+ad aca2 ab 2ac+2ad > d >
a+d
2a , then
for large enough N there exists a Weakly Darwinian update rule such that
C ⇢ S= {z : zxx0,H + zxy0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N,Uxx1,H  da}
[{z : zxx1,H + zxy1,H = N,zxx0,L+ zyx0,L = N,Uxx0,H  da}.
The proof outline for this theorem is similar to Theorem 2.2. By constructing a Weakly
Darwinian update rule, for every z-tree h of a state outside S, I can transform h into a z-
tree of some state in S with a lower cost. Then any state outside S cannot be a long run
equilibrium. Then the set of long run equilibria must be a subset of S.
A detailed proof can be found in APPENDIX 2C.
This theorem states that when certain condition on the parameters are met, there exists
some ’Weakly Darwinian’ update rule that will result in separating long run equilibria
where each location’s population consists of exactly one trait. Note that these separating
equilibria are not Pareto efficient and the payoffs of players of one trait are strictly higher
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than the other. Each trait’s population is in a sense Pareto efficient within their own location
as all players coordinate on x as their intra-trait action. The overall efficiency loss solely
comes from the fact that players of one trait end up staying at the inferior location.
2.4. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the influence of payoff-irrelevant traits on the evolutionary outcome
of asymmetric coordination games. I show that for population where traits can be changed
via adjustment and mutation, Pareto efficiency is always achieved, and in the majority of
the long run equilibria, one trait is eliminated from the population. Here a population can
represent simply a group or an organization, for example a company. It is often observed
that the employees in one firm can be rather united on political opinions and some firms
have a nearly unified racial makeup.
In an alternative setting in which traits are fixed and a second inferior location is intro-
duced, there can be situations in which separation is always present in all long run equi-
libria, in spite of the efficiency loss. This could help explain the part of segregation that is
unexplained by social-economic factors.
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES TO
PREDICT POPULATION HEALTH OUTCOMES FROM COMMUNITY
SURVEY DATASET
3.1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I develop a predictive model of the prevalences of 12 chronic non–communicable
diseases at regional level. Unlike many other studies, I mainly depend on socio-demographic
characteristics as regressors. In order to fully utilize the rich information provided by socio-
demographic data, I adopt Machine Learning techniques to help increase out-of-sample
model performance. This method can also be applied to other regional outcome predic-
tions.
Socio-demographic data are widely collected and updated via national census and com-
munity surveys. The U.S. Census Bureau, for example, carries out the American Commu-
nity Survey each year. While socio-demographic factors are widely used in health studies
(Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C., 1996; Metzler, M., 2007), their potential contribution can
still be underestimated. Regional socio-demographic factors usually remain similar or un-
changed when performing individual level health analysis, so these factors are mainly used
for adjusting and stratifying statistical analysis. Yet when analyzing regional level health
outcomes, they can make strong contributions to a predictive model.
Socio-demographic factors can have complex relationships with each other and with
health outcomes, which may suggest complicated functional forms. Standard statistical
methods may not be enough with those relationships present as they usually rely the user
to decide which functional form to use. Some Machine Learning methods such as neural
network may help as they do not rely on the user’s choice of functional form. In addition,
socio-demographic data usually contain large numbers of variables, posing difficulty to
standard statistical methods if one aims to fully utilize their information. When the number
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of variables is large, sometimes even larger than the number of data points, traditional
methods such as linear regressions will encounter a severe issue of overfitting, which occurs
when a predictive model corresponds too closely or exactly to the training data, and may
therefore fail to fit out-of-sample or out-of-time data reliably. In particular, this occurs
when a model contains more parameters than the data can justify. In the case of linear
regressions, having more variables than data points in the training dataset will result in
a regression line that goes through each data point and basically produces pure noise for
additional data.
Machine learning techniques can be powerful tools for building high quality predic-
tive models as well as dealing with large amount of variables. Various machine learning
approaches have been adopted in individual-level analysis. Rose (2013) develops a su-
per learner that integrates machine learning methods such as random forest and neural
network and applies this algorithm in the Study of Physical Performance and Age-Related
Changes in Sonomans (SPPARCS) to predict death among 2,066 residents of Sonoma, Cal-
ifornia, aged 54 years or more during the period 1993–1999. Gupta and Sunil et al. (2014)
use ensembles of 400 Support Vector Machines to predict cancer survival at 6, 12 and 24
months based on routinely collected digital data from a hospital digital dataset containing
information about the patient’s previous admissions and presentations and a purpose-built
cancer-specific registry (Evaluation of Cancer Outcomes from Victorian Cancer Outcomes
Network). Rana and Santu et al. (2014) compare various models of acute myocardial
infarction readmission based on the electronic medical record at a large regional hospi-
tal in Australia. The logistic regression with Lasso regularization outperforms the bench-
mark models on various metrics. Delen, Dursun, Oztekin, and Kong (2010) apply various
machine learning techniques to survival time prediction after organ transplantations and
prognosis analysis of different risk groups of transplant patients based on the nationwide
thoracic transplantation dataset from the United Network for Organ Sharing. They obtain
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an R2 value of 0.879 from a support vector machine model, 0.847 from an artificial neural
network model and 0.785 from a M5 algorithm-based regression tree model.
This paper differs from the literature because it focuses on a region-level analysis with
continuous outcome. This study is developed in close relationship to Luo et al. (2015),
which utilizes the Machine Learning method regularized regression to develop a predictive
model of state-level disease prevalence from the Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey (ACS) and CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). My paper
differs in the following aspects. First, my study uses census tract level (neighborhood
level geo-code used in the National Census) data instead of state level. Socio-demographic
factors vary widely within each state, so using a more detailed geological code can help
increase prediction quality and applicability. Second, this paper uses very different feature
spaces. I include much more socio-demographic characteristics to enhance performance,
socio-demographic variables from past several years to capture the chronic nature of the
diseases studied here and a set of health-related variables to compare their performances.
Third, this study utilizes a transformation on the dependent variables similar to fractional
regression instead of a linear regression as in Luo et al. (2015).
After performing the analysis, I find the following differences to Luo et al. (2015). First,
the outcome here achieves significantly higher out-of-sample performance than Luo et al.
(2015) among the diseases that appear in both studies. A more detailed comparison is avail-
able in Section 3.4. Second, Luo et al. (2015) uses six categories of socio-demographic
characteristics: age, sex, gender, household income, employment status, marital status and
education level. I find that other factors that may seem unrelated to health issues or cov-
ered by these categories may have better predictive power. Characteristics such as means of
transportation, past poverty status, family size and language spoken often show up among
the top 20 features across the 12 diseases studied in this paper.
This finding reflects the fact that our understanding of the underlying mechanisms and
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the determinants or indicators of many subjects, for example disease prevalence here, may
be limited. Common sense and knowledge may not withstand in analysis. Therefore it may
be beneficial to include more variables that are correlated and utilize Machine Learning
methods to mitigate the issue of overfitting.
Region-level analysis also offers insights on how to identify anomalies in health out-
comes. If a region’s health outcome is substantially better or worse than what its socio-
demographic characteristics indicate, it may be worthwhile to look into its specific health
policies, infrastructures, environment and so on. The methods studied in this study can
provide a benchmark to the “natural experiment”.
3.2. DATA
This study uses two sources of data. The first is the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) 500 Cities Project, which collects data on the prevalence of 13 chronic
diseases, prevention measures and unhealthy behavior of 500 cities at census tract level
from 2014 and 2015. The data used in this study include the prevalence of 12 chronic non-
contagious diseases collected in 2015 (i.e., arthritis, current asthma, high blood pressure),
prevention measures (i.e., health insurance, annual checkup, dental visit) and unhealthy
behaviors (i.e., binge drinking, current smoking, physical inactivity). The prevalence of
tooth loss was collected in 2014 and is not used in this analysis since the data of some
prevention measures and unhealthy behaviors were collected in 2015. These data include
around 28000 census tracts.
The second data source is the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS),
which contains demographic and social features at census tract level from 2010 to 2015.
The ACS collects various community characteristics through mail and telephone calls and
is updated annually. Variables include population proportions over brackets of age, gender,
race, household income, commute method, employment status, marital status, education
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level and college major. A total of around 21000 variables is included. Compared to the
number of census tracts included, this volume of features causes a severe issue of over-
fitting. A simple linear regression benchmark model achieves nearly 100% coefficient of
determination with in-sample prediction but turns out to produce complete noise when used
for out-of-sample prediction. Machine learning techniques can be powerful tools to deal
with this issue.
3.3. METHODS
I first randomly divide the dataset into a training set and a test set by a 70-30 ratio.
All predictive models are trained on the training set, and the score metrics are calculated
on the test set. Each observation corresponds to a census tract. Since the data on disease
prevalence contains only one year, only out-of-sample performance is evaluated, and there
is no out-of-time evaluation. Since the dependent variables are percentages, I utilize a
method similar to fractional regression. I carry out an inverse-logit transformation on the
dependent variables as follows: zki =  ln( 1yki   1), where k = 1,2, ...,12 represents the 12
diseases. Three sets of features are used. The set XALL includes all CDC features (preven-
tion measures and unhealthy behaviors) and all ACS features. The set XCDC includes all
CDC features and nothing else. The set XACS includes all ACS features and none of CDC
features. The regression equation is Zk = c+Xfb , where f = ALL,CDC,ACS represent the
sets of features.
Since the number of variables in the ACS data is extremely large, I face a severe risk of
overfitting. A popular method in machine learning to deal with this issue is regularization,
which shrinks coefficients towards zero and encourages a simpler model than a complex
one. In regularized regression, one minimizes Âi(zki   b0 Â j b jxi j)+ag(b ) instead of
Âi(zki   b0 Â j b jxi j) as in a linear regression, where g(·) is the regularization function
and a is the weight of regularization. I compare three forms of the regularization function:
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Lasso (g(b ) = Â j |b j|), Ridge (g(b ) = Â j b 2j ) and Elastic Net (g(b ) = l Â j |b j|+ (1 
l )Â j b 2j ) to ensure that the prediction is robust against choice of learning techniques. The
control parameter that decides the degree of regularization, a , is selected by 5-fold cross-
validation. After a model is fitted, predictions of disease prevalences are calculated on the
test data and R-squared metrics are calculated.
3.4. RESULTS
The main metric of performance I use is the out-of-sample R2. Among the three
methods, Lasso regression outperforms the other two mostly by 2% to 3%. A detailed
comparison is available in APPENDIX 3A. This may be due to the fact that many socio-
demographic features are irrelevant to health outcomes and Lasso is best equipped to elim-
inate them from the predictors. Table 3.1 shows the comparison of out-of-sample R2 from
Lasso regression on the test sample for each feature set is shown in following table. The
fourth column also includes the result from Luo et al (2015).
44
Disease Lasso-ALL Lasso-CDC Lasso-ACS Luo et al
Arthritis 0.965 0.907 0.882 -
High Blood Pressure 0.974 0.944 0.911 0.864
Cancer 0.972 0.910 0.876 -
Current Asthma 0.942 0.860 0.916 -
Coronary Heart Disease 0.975 0.916 0.893 0.806
COPD 0.976 0.909 0.934 -
Diabetes 0.985 0.969 0.943 0.911
High Cholesterol 0.947 0.889 0.846 -
Chronic Kidney Disease 0.977 0.905 0.925 -
Mental Unwellness 0.973 0.917 0.960 -
Physical Unwellness 0.982 0.936 0.966 -
Stroke 0.980 0.945 0.941 0.866
Table 3.1 Performance of Lasso Regularization - Out-of-sample R2
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of data points where the predicted value Lasso regres-
sion falls from within 0.25, 0.5 and 1 standard deviation of the actual value.
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Table 3.2 Lasso Regularization - Percentage within 0.25, 0.5 & 1 Standard Deviation
Recall that three different feature spaces are used: ALL (features from both CDC and
ACS), CDC (features from only CDC) and ACS (features from only ACS). Here I compare
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the performances of these three feature spaces.
Comparison 1. Out-of-sample performances of feature space ALL is better than both
CDC and ACS. This demonstrates that utilizing socio-demographic features along with
health-related factors can improve model performance. Each of the diseases achieves at
least 0.94 out-of-sample R2.
Comparison 2. For current Asthma, COPD, chronic kidney disease, mental Unwell-
ness and physical unwellness, out-of-sample R2 of ACS is better than that of CDC. For
the rest, out-of-sample R2’s of ACS are still well beyond 0.84. Similarly, prediction of
the prevalence of arthritis, cancer, current asthma, COPD, high cholesterol, chronic kidney
disease, mental unwellness, physical unwellness and stroke are more accurate based on
ACS than based on CDC. This outcome demonstrates the possibility of using ACS alone as
a benchmark for regions where health-related factors are not collected or of good quality.
For diseases like current asthma and etc., chronic socio-demographic factors actually have
more predictive power than the one-year health-related factors.
Now I look at the top performing features in each regression. Note that since the vari-
ables are normalized before fitting, a coefficient’s absolute value is representative of its
predictive power. Appendix 3A shows the top 10 performing features for feature spaces
ALL, CDC and ACS. Here some interesting observations can be made, which is discussed
below. However note that one shouldn’t assume a causal relationship between a feature and
the dependent variable. A feature with high performance means that it has a higher weight
when making out-of-sample predictions.
Many observations can be made on this matter. A few interesting observations are as
follows.
Observation 1. In the feature space ALL, for some diseases, the most representative
features are still health related factors contained in the CDC dataset, for instance the per-
centages of adults taking cholesterol screening, taking necessary medicine for high blood
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pressure control or with binge drinking. This finding is consistent with the literature mainly
focused on health related factors.
Observation 2. In the feature spaces ALL and ACS, the top performing variables
from ACS are mainly in the following categories: means of transportation to work, poverty
status, age, gender, class of worker, place of work, household language, house heating fuel,
education level and family size. Observe that among these variables, not all of them seem
directly related to health outcomes. A comparison to the categories used in Luo et al (2015)
shows that limiting the feature space to characteristics that seem more directly related to
health outcomes may not maximize the information obtained from population surveys. For
example, household language here actually performs better than race, which may suggest
that which racial circle or culture households adopt may matter more than what races they
actually belong to. Means of transportation show up in among the top 20 features for 7
out of the 12 diseases, which may not be the most relevant variable at first glance. These
finding does not necessarily indicate that these factors are the determinants of the diseases.
It is possible that one’s idea of health or lifestyle is better reflected in variables such as the
means of transportation via some complex relationships. Another category that is predictive
for all almost all diseases is poverty status among the past 12 months. Since the price of
goods can vary vastly across different regions, understandably localized poverty status is a
better predictor than general income buckets.
3.5. DISCUSSION
This paper shows that socio-demographic factors can be used to, both alone or with
health-related variables, to obtain high quality out-of-sample predictions of the prevalence
of non-communicable chronic diseases. Socio-demographic factors can be very useful for
enhancing prediction for regions in which health data are collected and for obtaining a
benchmark for regions in which health data are not as well collected or updated. This also
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demonstrates the importance of socio-demographic features as indicators or determinants
of non-communicable chronic disease prevalence. It can also be used to spot outliers that
may require additional investigation into region-specific policies and environments.
However, as explained in Luo and Nguyen et al. (2015), some potential weaknesses
come with the data used here. The CDC uses phone calls (cell and landline) to collected
self-reported information on a stratified sample of phone numbers. ACS, on the other hand,
collects information via phone call, mail, internet and in-person interactions on a stratified
sample of households. Inherent from self-reported information are errors of noncoverage,
nonresponse and measurement bias. For example, measurements of mental and physical
unwellness are subject to the accuracy of interviewees’ memory, and for some other dis-
eases, diagnose rate may vary across different communities due to differences in income
and awareness. The difference in sample stratification between two data sources may also
cause inconsistencies. Another limitation of this study is that since the health outcome
at census tract level is only available in one year, no out-of-time testing was performed.
Generalization of the models to predict future health outcomes need to be cautious and
tested.
Apart from the techniques demonstrated in this study, various other machine learning
methods can be useful to explore. For example, multi-task learning can be utilized to further
mitigate the issue of overfitting and enhance model performance since the prevalences of
different non-communicable chronic diseases can be closely related and modeling them
separately might lose information on their underlying connection. A multi-task learning
with soft-restraint could potentially further enhance the model performance. For example,
a multi-task Lasso model with hard-restraint clustering arthritis, coronary heart disease and
high cholesterol increases out-of-sample R2 of arthritis prevalence prediction from 0.882
to 0.884.
One reason why socio-demographic characteristics are useful may be that the large
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volume of features are more likely to include variables that reflect key information via some
complicated mechanisms. It may be beneficial to include more variables that are correlated
instead of hand picking a few socio-demographic characteristics based on relevance before
the analysis.
In summary, socio-demographic characteristics are a rich source of information for
health studies and potentially other fields as well. Due to the volume of data collected in
these surveys, machine learning techniques can be useful for building high quality predic-
tive models, which can enhance prediction quality, serve as benchmarks when related data
are lacking and provide insight for policy and environment improvements.
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APPENDIX 1
Here I provide proofs for the propositions and theorems in the main text.
Proof [Proposition 1.1].
Let g0 be a smallest nonempty network (in the sense of set inclusion) that is a subset of
g and lies in G(m, l). Such a network exists (possibly g itself) since g 2 G(m, l) and is thus
m-l-critical. The second statement follows Theorem 1, which is proven below. QED.
Proof [Theorem 1.1].
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Jackson et al (2012).
Fix m and l and in the following proof I will simplify notations involving m and l.
I first show that if g 2 RPNk then g 2 TCk. I prove by induction on k. The result is
obvious when k = 0. Now, assume that it holds through k 1 and consider some k.
Given a network g 2 RPNk, by definition it follows that on the equilibrium path all
favors are performed and g is sustained. So for any i and i j 2 g, if i is called upon to
do a favor via link i j and declines, then at least one possible continuation must lead to a
network g0 ⇢ g  i j such that g0 2 RPNk0 = TCk0 , |Nli (g0)|  |Nli (g)| m, and there is no
g00 ⇢ g  i j such that g00 2 RPNk00 and |Nl(g00)| > |Nl(g0)|. Otherwise, if i did not perform
the favor, he or she would save the cost c and lose access to at most m  1 agents in any
continuation. Thus, i would benefit from deviating and not performing the favor since (m 
1)d p(v c)1 d < c< m
d p(v c)
1 d , which contradicts the fact that g is sustained as a renegotiation-
proof equilibrium. Thus, for every i and ij, there exists g0 ⇢ g  i j such that g0 2 TCk0
for some k0, |Nli (g0)|  |Nli (g)| m, and there is no g00 ⇢ g  i j such that g00 2 TCk00 and
|Nl(g00)|> |Nl(g0)|. Therefore, g 2 TCk.
Next, I show that if g 2 TCk then g 2 RPNk. Again, I prove this by induction on the
number of links in a network. Note in this part, strategies need to be considered. As such,
I work with a stronger induction hypothesis, with the induction indexed by k, number of
links in the network. Assume that starting from any node and any g0 2 Gk, there exists
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a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium continuation such that (i) there is a unique
network g1 2 RPNk1 for some k1  k that is reached and sustained in perpetuity in the
continuation, with g1 = g0 if g0 2 TCk, such that (ii) on the equilibrium continuation path
a favor is performed if and only if both sides are within distance l in g1; and (iii) in any
subgame starting with some network g0 2 Gk0 with k0  k if g00 is played in perpetuity with
some probability in the continuation then g00 2 RPNk00 for some k00 and there does not exist
any g000 ⇢ g0 such that g000 2 RPNk000 and ui(g000)   ui(g00) for all i with strict inequality for
some i.
First, note that RPN0 = { /0}= TC0. Also note that starting from g0 = /0 there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium continuation (no favors can be supplied and no links can be
sustained) and so it follows directly that conditions (i)–(iii) are satisfied.
Now assume that the induction hypothesis holds for all k0 < k. I show that the same
is true for k. Begin with the case g0 = g 2 TCk. On the equilibrium path, have all agents
maintain all links (so Li(gt) = N1i (gt) whenever gt = g0 = g) and perform all favors. The
off-the-equilibrium-path strategies are described as follows. If an agent i is called upon to
provide a favor for an agent i0 such that d(i, i0)  l and does not perform the favor, which
leads to link ij being deleted, then the continuation is as follows. Given that g2 TCk, by the
definition of transitive m-l-criticality, there exists g0 ⇢ g  i j such that g0 2 TCk0 = RPNk0 ,
|Nli (g0)|  |Nli (g)| m and there is no g00 ⇢ g  i j such that g00 2 TCk00 for any k00 and
|Nl(g00)|> |Nl(g0)|. Denote this network by g(i, j) = g0. Following i’s failure to perform a
favor to i0, let the continuation be such that Lh(g  i j) = Nh(g(i, j)) for all h. This results
in the network g(i, j) 2 RPNk0 following the link announcement stage, and so from then
on there is a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium sustaining g(i, j) and satisfying
(i)–(iii) by the induction hypothesis, and so let agents play the strategies corresponding to
such an equilibrium in that continuation. At all other nodes off the equilibrium path for
which strategies are not already specified the nodes are necessarily at a network with fewer
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links, and so pick a pure strategy equilibrium continuation that satisfies (i)–(iii), which is
possible by the induction hypothesis. This satisfies (i)–(iii) by construction.
To check that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium, by the specification of the strategies
above, it suffices to only check that no agent wants to deviate from the equilibrium path,
and also that following some i’s failure to provide a favor and losing link ij, no agent h
wants to deviate from Lh(g  i j) = N1h (g(i, j)). By construction, the agent i who is called
upon to do a favor and deviates will end up losing access to at least m agents, and this
cannot be an improving deviation. Next, consider, some agent h’s incentive to deviate from
Lh = N1h (g0) if g0 is still in play, or else from Lh(g  i j) = N1h (g(i, j)) following some i’s
failure to provide a favor. By not deviating, the agent gets the payoff from g0 or g(i, j)
in perpetuity. By deviating, the agent h will end up with a continuation starting from a
network g00 ⇢ g0 or g00 ⇢ g(i, j), respectively, where the agent has not gained any access
and may have lost some access. Since access to any agent has a positive future expected
value, this cannot be an improving deviation.
Next, I show that from any node in the subgame from some initial g0 /2 TCk there exists
a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium continuation satisfying (i)–(iii). There are two
types of nodes to consider. One is a node at which some agent i is called upon to provide a
favor for an agent i0 such that d(i, i0) l, and another is a node where agents announce the
links they wish to sustain.
First, consider a node starting at g0 where agents announce the links that they wish
to sustain. Find some g0 that has the maximal k0 < k of links such that g0 2 RPNk0 and
g0 ⇢ g0. For each h set L0h = N1h (g0) and then from g0 play a continuation satisfying (i)–(iii)
(by the induction step). If any agent deviates, to L such that L0h ⇢ L, then play the same
continuation, as this will not affect the network formed. Otherwise, the continuation will
lead to some g00 with strictly fewer links for l and since g0 2 RPN, the continuation will
necessarily result in a lower expected continuation payoff. This establishes the claim for
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this type of nodes.
Next, consider a node at which some agent i is called upon to provide a favor for an
agent i0 such that d(i, i0) l. There are two cases that can follow: one where i performs the
favor and so the resulting network is then g0. In that case, the game moves to the phase of
announcing which links to keep for each agent and I have just shown that there is a pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium continuation satisfying (i) to (iii). Let g´ be the net-
work sustained on the equilibrium path in one of these that has the largest |Nli (g0)| for i. If i
does not perform the favor and lose link ij, then g  i j 2 Gk 1 is reached. By the induction
hypothesis again there is a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium continuations satis-
fying (i)–(iii), and let g00 be a network sustained by one of these that has the largest |Nli (g0)|
for i. Now, based on those two continuations, let i choose a pure strategy best response.
The claim follows. QED.
Proof [Proposition 1.2].
Assume that a network g is robust to degree 1 with l > 1. By Proposition 1, there exist
a smallest m-l-critical network g0 ✓ g and there doesn’t exist any m-l-critical network g⇤
such that g⇤ ⇢ g0. Since g is robust to degree 1, so is g’. Now if any agent i in g’ deletes a
link, all links are lost. Since g’ is robust to degree 1, only links that can be deleted are links
among i’s 1-neighbors. Therefore all agents in g’ must be linked with each other (since g’s
is minimally critical and doesn’t contain isolated nodes). Now delete any link ij and the
remaining network g” is still in G(m, l) and therefore must contain a nonempty m-l-critical
network, which then must be a strict subset of g’. This contradicts with the fact that g’ is a
smallest m-l-critical network. QED.
Proof [Theorem 1.2].
First, I show that if g is a star network of size mt + 1 for some integer t then g is
renegotiation-proof and robust to degree 2.
I prove this by induction on t that SN(mt+1) are renegotiation-proof and star network
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of all other sizes are not. For t = 1, the assumption clearly holds. Assume for all t 0 < t, the
assumption holds.
Now consider t. For any star network of size s where m(t  1)+ 1 < s < mt+ 1, the
center agent can delete any link and then reach SN[m(t   1) + 1]. He will lose access
to at most m-1 agents and therefore such star network is not renegotiation-proof. For star
network of sizemt+1, if the center agent deletes any link, then the subsequent continuation
will be SN[m(t 1)+1] and i will lose access to m agents. This means that the center agent
will not deviate. Other agents will not delete any link either since they will lose access to
all agents if they do. Thus SN(mt 0+1) is renegotiation-proof and the induction assumption
holds for t since the maximum distance of any two agents in SN(mt+1) is 2.
Second, I show that if a network g is renegotiation-proof and robust to degree 2 then g
must be SN(mt+1) for some integer t.
First, I consider any minimally m-l-critical network gc that is robust to degree 2. By ro-
bustness to degree 2, there can’t exist any i 6= j such that distance(i, j)> 2. Also obviously
gc 2 G(m, l).
Fix a pair of linked agent (i, j).
If N1i (gc)\N1j (gc) 6= /0, then pick k 6= i, j such that k 2 N1i (gc)\N1j (gc) and consider
gc  i j. The distance between any two nodes will increase by at most 1. Since l   4> 2+1,
gc   i j 2 G(m, l) and by Proposition 1, gc   i j contains a m-l-critical network, which
contradicts with the fact that gc is a minimally m-l-critical network.
Now suppose N1i (gc)\N1j (gc) = /0. If there exist k,r 6= i, j such that k 2 N1i (gc) and r 2
N1j (gc), then since d(k,r) 2, k and r must be linked or share a common direct neighbour.
Again consider gc  i j. The distance between any two nodes will increase by at most 2.
Since l   4= 2+2, gc  i j 2 G(m, l) and by Proposition 1, gc  i j contains a m-l-critical
network, which contradicts with the fact that gc is a minimally critical network.
Therefore only one of N1i (gc)  { j} and N1j (gc)  {i} can be nonempty. Suppose
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N1i (gc) { j} 6= /0. All of i’s direct neighbours must have no other links. Then obviously gc
is SN(m+1).
Therefore if a network g is renegotiation-proof and robust to degree 2 then the only type
of minimally critical networks contained by g must be SN(m+1).
As shown above, g must contain a SN(m+1) subnetwork gc. If gc has links to agents
outsides of gc on its non-center agents, then suppose one of those links is jk with j 2 gc and
k /2 gc. Now take another non-center node of gc, i2 gc . Then I have (gc  i j)[ jk 2G(m, l)
and it must contain a m,l-critical network, which cannot be SN(m+ 1). This contradicts
with the conclusion above.
Now none of the SN(m+1) subnetwork(s) has links to outside on its non-center node.
Then g must be a star network. By the proof above, a star network can be renegotiation-
proof iff it is SN(mt+1) for some integer t. Therefore, g is renegotiation-proof and robust
to degree 2 if g is SN(mt+1) for some integer t. QED.
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APPENDIX 2A
To prove Theorem 2.2, I first define a few concepts and propose several lemmas to
facilitate the characterization. Denote the k-fold product of function b(·) as bk(·).
Recall the definition of the costs as follows.
Definition [Cost Function]. The cost of an arrow from z to z0 for any z,z0 2 Z, denoted
cz,z0 2 R+, is defined as the speed of pz,z0(e) converging to zero as e tends to zero, i.e.,
cz,z0 = max{c : pz,z0(e) = O(ec) as e ! 0}.
Let the cost from a state z0 to a set of states B be the minimum sum of costs of a sequence
of arrows zi! zi+1, i= 0,1, ...,k 1 from z0 to a state zk in B, denoted as
cz0,B = minzi2Z,zk2B{
k 1
Â
i=0
czi,zi+1}.
Let the cost of a z-tree h be the sum of the costs of all the arrows in h, i.e.,
c(h) = Â
(zi!z j)2h
czi,z j .
The minimal cost of a z-tree of a state z is called the transition cost of z and is given by
vz = minh2Hz{c(h)}.
The cost of an arrow can be characterized by the following lemma. Intuitively, cz,z0
equals the minimum number of mutations needed to mutate from b(z) to z0.
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Lemma 2.1. For any z,z0 2 Z, cz,z0 = |b(z)  z0|1/2.
Proof.
Recall that the transition probability is pz,z0(e) = Prob(z(t+ 1) = z0|z(t) = z) and the
population follows the stochastic equation z(t+1) = b[z(t)]+ x(t)  y(t).
Then I have
pz,z0(e) = Prob(z(t+1) = z0|z(t) = z) = Prob(x(t)  y(t) = z0  b(z)|z(t) = z).
Let V (z) = {y : zg   yg   0} be the domain of the random variable y(t). Breaking the
expression of pz,z0(e) down by the values of y(t), I get
pz,z0(e) = Â
y2V [b(z)]
Prob[x(t)  y(t) = z0  b(z)|z(t) = z,y(t) = y] ·Prob[y(t) = y|z(t) = z].
Let bg(z),g 2 G be the elements of vector b(z). Then for all y 2V [b(z)], I have
Prob[y(t) = y|z(t) = z] = (’
g2G
✓
bg(z)
yg
◆
) · e |y|1(1  e)N |y|1
Therefore
pz,z0(e)= Â
y2V [b(z)]
Prob[x(t) y= z0 b(z)|z(t)= z,y(t)= y] ·(’
g2G
✓
bg(z)
yg
◆
) ·e |y|1(1 e)N |y|1 .
Obviously Prob[x(t)  y = z0   b(z)|zt = z,y(t) = y] > 0 only if |y|1   12 |b(z)  z0|1 as
it takes at least 12 |b(z)  z0|1 mutations to change from b(z) to z0.
Notice that Prob[x(t)  y= z0  b(z)|zt = z,y(t) = y] is independent of e . Then pz,z0(e)
can be written as a polynomial of e . Let pz,z0(e) = Âs az,z0(e,s)es.
Notice that in each term Prob[x(t)  y = z0   b(z)|zt = z,y(t) = y] · (’g2G
 bg(z)
yg
 
) ·
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e |y|1(1  e)N |y|1 , the minimum power of e is |y|1. Then the leading term of pz,z0(e) is
Â
y2{y2V [b(z)]:|y|1= 12 |b(z) z0|1}
Prob[x(t) y= z0 b(z)|z(t)= z,y(t)= y] ·(’
g
✓
bg(z)
yg
◆
) ·e 12 |b(z) z0|1
and the minimum power of e in pz,z0(e) is min{s : az,z0(e,s) 6= 0}= 12 |b(z)  z0|1.
Now consider
pz,z0(e)
ek = Âs az,z0(e,s)e
s k.
Notice that lime!0es k =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
• i f s  k < 0
1 i f s  k = 0
0 i f s  k > 0
and s  k < 0 for some s if k > 12 |b(z) 
z0|1. Then for all k > 12 |b(z)  z0|1, I have
lime!0
pz,z0(e)
ek
=Â
s
lime!0az,z0(e,s)es k = •.
So pz,z0(e) 6= O(ek) for all k > 12 |b(z)  z0|1.
For all k  12 |b(z)  z0|1, I have
lime!0
pz,z0(e)
ek
= lime!0az,z0(e, |y|1)e
1
2 |b(z) z0|1 k < •.
Then there exist positive real numbersM0 and e0 such that
| pz,z0(e)
ek
  lime!0az,z0(e, |y|1)e
1
2 |b(z) z0|1 k|<M0
for all |e|< e0. Then for all |e|< e0, I have
|pz,z0(e)|< (M0+ |lime!0az,z0(e, |y|1)e
1
2 |b(z) z0|1 k|)|e|k.
So I have
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pz,z0(e) = O(ec) as e ! 0 whenever c 12 |b(z)  z
0|1.
Therefore
cz,z0 = max{c : pz,z0(e) = O(ec) as e ! 0}= 12 |b(z)  z
0|1.
Q.E.D.
From this lemma, I have that cz,b(z) = 0. An arrow from a state z to its update b(z) costs
zero. Here I define the basin of attraction of a set of states A as the set of states that will,
without mutation, eventually lead to a state in A via update and stay there in the long term.
Definition [Basin of Attraction]. The basin of attraction of a set of states A is
B(A) = {z0 : limk!•bk(z0) 2 A}.
In particular, if A is a singleton, I write B({z}) as B(z).
A state z0 is called a neighbour of another state z if 12 |z  z0| = 1. Intuitively, I define
two steady states z,z0 to be connected if there is a sequence of steady states such that each
is a neighbour of its predecessor and successor, the first is a neighbour of z and the last
is a neighbour of z0. For example, a state z = (zxxo = N) is connected to z0 = (zxxo =
N 2,zxy0 = 2) since we can find z1 = (zxx0 = N 1,zxy0 = 1) which is a steady state and
is a neighbour of both z and z0. Then I define a set to be a maximal connected set if it
include all the connected steady states of any of its elements. Then I define the escape cost
of a maximal connected set of steady states as the minimum aggregate cost of a sequences
of arrows from one of its elements to a state outside its basin of attraction.
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Definition [Connectedness] . Two steady states z,z0 are connected if there exists a se-
quence of steady states zi, i= 1,2, ...,k such that 12 |z  z1|1 = 12 |zi  zi+1|1 = 12 |zk  z0|1 = 1
for all i = 1,2, ...k. A set of steady states, A, is connected if 8z,z0 2 A, z and z0 are con-
nected. A set of steady states, A, is a maximal connected set if A is a connected set and
8z 2 A,z0 /2 A, z and z0 are not connected. Let the escape cost of a maximal connected set
A be the minimum cost from a state z in A to Z\B(A), i.e.,
EC(A) = minz2A{cz,Z\B(A)}.
Note that
EC(A) = minz2A{cz,Z\B(A)} minz2A,z02Z\B(A){cz,z0}.
The escape cost of a maximal connected set A is at most the minimum cost of an arrow
from a state in A to a state outside B(A).
The following lemma shows that that for any connected set of steady states A, the
transition cost is the same for all of its elements. Denote this transition cost as vA.
Lemma 2.2. Let A be a connected set of steady states, then
8z,z0 2 A,vz = vz0 .
Proof.
For any z,z0 2 A, there exists a sequence of zi, i= 1,2, ...k such that 12 |z  z1|1 = 12 |zi 
zi+1|1 = 12 |zk z0|1 = 1 for all i= 1,2, ...k 1. Take any z-tree h of z and make the following
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change: change arrows initiated from z,z1,z2, ...,zk into z! z1, zi! zi+1, zk! z0 and delete
the arrow initiated from z0. Denote the resulting z-tree as h’ and h’ is a z-tree of z0. Notice
that since z,z0,z1,z2, ...,zk are all steady states, any arrow initiated from them costs at least
1. So
c(h)  c(h0) 
k 1
Â
i=1
(1  czi,zi+1)+1  cz,z1 +1  czk,z0 .
Since z,z0,zi for all i= 1,2, ...k are steady states, I have
cz,z1 =
1
2
|b(z)  z1|1 = 12 |z  z
1|1 = 1,
czi,zi+1 =
1
2
|b(zi)  zi+1|1 = 12 |z
i  zi+1|1 = 1
and czk,z0 =
1
2
|b(zk)  z|1 = 12 |z
k  z0|1 = 1.
Therefore
c(h)  c(h0) 
k 1
Â
i=1
(1  1
2
|zi  zi+1|1)+1  12 |z  z
1|1+1  12 |z
k  z0|1 = 0.
So h’ costs no more than h. Since this is true for any z-tree of z, I have vz  vz0 ,8z,z0 2A.
Therefore vz = vz0 ,8z,z0 2 A.
Q.E.D.
Now I show that if the cost from a state z to a maximal connected set of steady states,
A, is lower than the escape cost of A, then z must have a larger transition cost than any
element of A.
The intuition here is that if it incurs a lower cost to go from a state z0 to the basin
of attraction of a maximal connected set of steady states A than to escape the basin of
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attraction of A, then for any z-tree of z0, I can always find a z-tree of some state in A that
has a lower cost.
Lemma 2.3. Let A be a maximal connected set of steady states. For any steady state
z0 /2 B(A), if cz0,B(A)  EC(A), i.e., the cost from z to B(A) is at most the escape cost of A,
then vz0   vA. Furthermore, if cz0,B(A) < EC(A), then vz0 > vA.
Proof.
Take any z-tree h of z0. Since z0 /2 B(A), there exists a sequence of arrows zi! zi+1, i=
0,1, ...k  1 from z0 to a state zk 2 B(A) such that Âk 1i=0 czi,zi+1 = cz0,B(A). This is the path
from z0 to B(A) that achieves the minimum cost.
Since h is a z-tree of z0, from any state there must be a path to z0. So if I trace all
the arrows in h initiated from the states in A, there must exist such a sequence of states
e j, j= 1,2, ..., l, such that e1 2 A, el /2 B(A), e j 2 B(A)\A for j= 2,3, ..., l 1 and ei! ei+1
is in h. This is a path from a steady state in A to a state outside of B(A) that does not go
through any other steady states in A.
Since A is a maximal connected set, it is easy to find a function f : A! A such that a)
f (e1) = e1; b) 8z 2 A\{e1}, cz, f (z) = 12 | f (z)  z|1 = 1; c) lims!• f s(z) = e1. Then for any
state z 2 A\{e1}, I have cz, f (z) = 12 |b(z)  f (z)|= 12 |z  f (z)|= 1.
Now make the following change to h: change all arrows initiated from z0,z1, ...,zk 1
and e1,e2, ...,el into zi! zi+1 for all i= 0,1, ...k 1, z! f (z) for all z 2 A\{e1}, z! b(z)
for all z 2 B(A)\A and delete the arrow initiated from e1. Denote the resulting z-tree as h’
and h’ is a z-tree of e1. Notice that any arrow initiated from any state costs at least zero and
any arrow initiated from any steady state costs at least one. Now
c(h)  c(h0)  Â
z2A\{e1}
(1  cz, f (z)) 
k 1
Â
i=0
czi,zi+1 +
l 1
Â
j=1
ce j,e j+1 =
l 1
Â
j=1
ce j,e j+1 
k 1
Â
i=0
czi,zi+1 .
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Note that Âl 1i=1 cei,ei+1   EC(A). Since cz0,B(A)  EC(A), I have
c(h)  c(h0)  EC(A)  cz⇤,B(A)   0.
The cost of h’ is smaller than or equal to h. In particular, if cz0,B(A) < EC(A), the cost
of h’ is strictly smaller than h. Since this is true for any z-tree of z0, I have vz0   vz1 = vA if
cz0,B(A)  EC(A) and vz0 > vA if cz0,B(A) < EC(A).
Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX 2B
Now I show the proof of Theorem 2.2.
Proof [Theorem 2.2].
Take any state z that is not a steady state. Since there is no loop via update by Assump-
tion (2.2), suppose that z 2 B(z0) and let A be the a maximal connected set of steady states
that contains z0. Note that A could be a singleton. Then cz,B(A) = 0 < EC(A) and then by
Lemma 2.3 vz > vA. Thus by Theorem 2.1 I have z /2C.
Therefore the set of long run equilibria C must be a subset of the set of the steady states.
Let Z⇤ be the set of states that are payoff steady. I partition Z⇤ into four subsets, I1 to I4, as
shown below.
I1 = {z : zxx0+ zxy0 = N}[{z : zxx0+ zxx1 = N}[{z : zyx1+ zxx1 = N},
I2 = {z : zyx0 = zxy1 = N2 },
I3 = {z : zxy0 = zyx1 = N2 }[{z : zyx0 = zxy1 =
N
2
},
I4 = {z : zyx0+ zyy0 = N, 1N+1((zyx0+1)a+ zyy0c) d}[{z : zyy0+ zyy1 = N}
[{z : zxy1+ zyy1 = N, 1N+1((zxy1+1)a+ zyy1c) d},
I5 = {z : z /2 I1[ I2[ I3[ I4,z 2 Z⇤}.
Note for N that is odd, I3 = /0.
Now I examine them one by one.
First, I show that 8z,z0 2 I1, vz = vz0 and 8z,z0 2 I4, vz = vz0 . This follows directly from
Lemma 2.2 since I1 and I4 are both maximal connected sets of steady states.
Denote the set of all one-step mutations mutations from any state in I1 as D1. For any
z 2D1 in which zxx0 > 0 and zxy0 > 0, either z lies in I1 or xx0 has a higher payoff than any
other group for large enough N. Then after one step of update, the population will end up
in a steady state in I1 according to Assumption (2.3). So for any z 2 D1 in which zxx0 > 0
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and zxy0 > 0, I have z 2 B(I1).
Similar arguments hold for any state z 2D1 with zxx1 > 0 and zyx1 > 0 and for any state
z 2 D1 with zxx0 > 0 and zxx1 > 0.
Now consider a state z 2 D1 with zxx0 = N  1 and zxy0 = zxx1 = 0. Now z /2 I1. If the
remaining player is a member of yx0, then xx1 will have the maximum payoff. After one
update, yx0 becomes empty and only xx1 and xx0 may be populated. Then the population
ends up in a steady state in I1 after one step of update according to Assumption (2.3). So
b(z) 2 B(I1). The same argument holds if the remaining player is a member of xy1.
If the remaining player is a member of yy0, then xx1 and xy0 has the maximum payoff.
Now consider b(z). In b(z), I have zyy0 = 0. And the population at b(z) consists of groups
xx0, xx1 and xy0 (some may be of zero size). If xy0 or xx1 is empty in b(z) then b(z) 2 I1.
If both xx1 and xy0 are populated, then xx0 has the maximum payoff and remain so in all
subsequent updates until xy0 or xx1 reaches size zero, which is a steady state in I1. So
b(z) 2 B(I1).
If the remaining player is a member of yx1, then xx1 has the maximum payoff and
the population will end up in a steady state in I1 after one step of update according to
Assumption (2.3). So b(z) 2 B(I1).
If the remaining player is a member of yy1, then xy0 has the maximum payoff and
the population will end up in a steady state in I1 after one step of update according to
Assumption (2.3). So b(z) 2 B(I1).
Therefore for any state z 2D1 with zxx0 = N 1 and zxy0 = zxx1 = 0, I have b(z) 2 B(I1)
and z 2 B(I1) for large enough N. The same argument holds for any state z 2 D1 with
zxx1 = N  1 and zyx1 = zxx0 = 0. Therefore for any z 2 D1, I have z 2 B(I1). Then the
escape cost of I1, EC(I1), is at least 2 because any arrow from a steady state in I1 costs at
least one, any arrow from a state in B(I1) to a state outside B(I1) costs at least one and there
is no one-cost from a state in I1 to outside B(I1).
66
Now I show that I3 \C = /0. Take z0 = (zxy0 = N2 , zyx1 = N2 ) 2 I3 and consider z1 =
(zxy0 = N2 +1, zyx1 =
N
2  1). Now groups xy0 and yx1 have higher payoffs than the rest of
the eight groups and xy0 has a higher payoff than yx1. By Assumptions (2.2) and (2.3),
the only path possible is for xy0 to continue to increase in size, yx1 to continue to decrease
in size and all other groups to continue to remain at zero size. Then I have limk!•bk(z1) =
(zxy0 = N) 2 I1. So z1 2 B((zxy0 = N)) ⇢ B(I1) and cz0,B(I1) = 1 < 2  EC(I1). Then by
Lemma 2.3, vz0 > vI1 and then by Theorem 2.1 z0 /2C and I3\C = /0.
Now I show that I4\C = /0. Suppose k⇤ = max 1
N+1 ((k+1)a+(N k)zyy0c)d{k}. Take z
0 =
(zyx0 = k⇤,zyy0 = N k⇤) 2 I4 and consider z1 = (zyx0 = k⇤,zyy0 = N k⇤ 1,zxx1 = 1). At
z1, the payoff of group yy0 is lower than the payoffs of yx0. Then from z1 to b(z1), yy0
shrinks in size and can have at most N  k⇤  2 players. If at b(z1), xx1 has a positive size,
then yy0 will have a lower payoff than yx0. If at b(z1), xx1 has a zero size, then yy0 will
have a lower payoff than xx1. Either way, yy0 will continue to shrink in size as long as yy0
has less than or equal to N  k⇤   2 players. So similarly in subsequent updates, yy0 will
keep shrinking until its size reaches zero. Now only xx1 and yx0 are populated. Then in
subsequent updates, xx1 always have the maximum payoff and keeps growing until its size
reaches N and the population reaches the steady state (zxx1 =N)2 I1. Therefore z1 2 B(I1).
So cz0,I1 = 1 < EC(I1). Then by Lemma 2.3, vI4 = vz0 > vI1 and then by Theorem 2.1
I4\C = /0 .
Now consider I5. Let Q⇤ = { pq : p,g2N, p,q2 [1,N]}. I show that for a bd c /2Q⇤, I have
I5 = /0.
For simplicity, for example, I write the set of steady states in which only groups yx0,xx1,xy1
are populated as {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}. Obviously not every state with only these three groups
populated is a steady state but I omit the conditions in the notation for simplicity.
First, for every possible combination of populated groups, I check if one group is guar-
anteed to have a strictly higher or lower payoff than another group. Such states are not
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steady states regardless their size ratio.
Here I write out the full list of steady states in I5 as follows.
I5 = {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}[{(xy0,yx1,yy1)}[{(xy1,xx0,yx0)}[{(yx1,xy0,yy0}
[{(xx0,xy0,xx1,yx1)}[{(xx0,xy0,xy1,yx1)}[{(xx0,xy0,xy1,yy1)}
[{(xx0,yx0,xx1,xy1)}[{(xx0,yy0,xx1,yy1)}[{(xx0,yy0,xy1,yx1)}
[{(xx0,yy0,xy1,yy1)}[{(xy0,yx0,xx1,yx1)}[{(xy0,yx0,xx1,yy1)}
[{(xy0,yx0,xy1,yx1)}[{(xy0,yy0,yx1,yy1)}[{(yx0,yy0,xx1,yx1)}
[{(yx0,yy0,xx1,yy1)}[{(yx0,yy0,xy1,yy1)}[{(xx0,xy0,yx0,yy0,xx1,xy1,yx1,yy1)}.
Let Q⇤ = { pq : p,g 2 N, p,q 2 [1,N]}. Consider a bd c /2 Q⇤.
Take a z 2 {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}. For z to be a steady state, I require that
zyx0d+ zxx1a+ zxy1a= zyx0a+ zxx1a+ zxy1c= zyx0a+ zxx1b+ zxy1d.
I have zyx0zxy1 =
a d
a c ,
zxx1
zxy1
= d ca b , then N = zxy1(
a2 ab ad+bd+ad+c2 cd ac+a2 ab ac+bc
(a c)(a b) ).
So zxy1 =
N(a c)(a b)
2a2 2ab+bd+c2 cd 2ac+bc , zyx0 =
N(a d)(a b)
2a2 2ab+bd+c2 cd 2ac+bc ,
zxx1 =
N(a c)(d c)
2a2 2ab+bd+c2 cd 2ac+bc .
For all a bd c /2 Q⇤, this steady state is not feasible.
Consider z 2 {xy0,yx1,yy1}. For z to be a steady state, first I require that
zxy0a+ zyx1d+ zyy1d = zxy0d+ zyx1a+ zyy1c= zxy0d+ zyx1b+ zyy1d.
Solving this I get
zxy0
zyx1
= d ba b ,
zyy1
zyx1
= a bd c . Then zyz1 =
N(a b)(d c)
d2 2bd cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac ,
zxy0 =
N(d b)(d c)
d2 2bd cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac , z
yy1
yy1 =
N(a b)2
d2 2bd cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac .
For all a bd c /2 Q⇤, this steady state is not feasible.
Consider a state z 2 {xx0,yx0,xx1,xy1}. For z to be a steady state, first I require that
zxx0a+ zyx0c+ zxx1a+ zxy1a= zxx0b+ zyx0d+ zxx1a+ zxy1a
= zxx0a+ zyx0a+ zxx1a+ zxy1c= zxx0a+ zyx0a+ zxx1b+ zxy1d.
68
Solving this I get zxx0zyx0 =
d c
a b ,
zxx1
zxy1
= d ca b ,
zyx0
zxy1
= 1. Then zyx0 = zxy1 =
(a b)N
2(d c+a b) and
zxx0 = zxx1 =
(d c)N
2(d c+a b) . For all
a b
d c /2 Q⇤, this steady state is not feasible.
For other steady states in I4, a similar analysis is carried out and it can be shown that
for all a bd c /2 Q⇤, I5 = /0.
Now Q⇤ ⇢Q and is countable so has a zero measure on R++. So I5 = /0 for a bd c almost
everywhere on R++.
Q.E.D.
Proof [Theorem 2.3]
Based on the proof of Theorem 2.2, I haveC\ (I3[ I4) = /0.
Now consider I5. For simplicity, for example, I write the set of steady states in which
only groups yx0,xx1,xy1 are populated as {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}. Obviously not every state with
only these three groups populated is a steady state but I omit the conditions in the notation
for simplicity.
First, for every possible combination of populated groups, I check if one group is guar-
anteed to have a strictly higher or lower payoff than another group. Such states are not
steady states regardless their size ratio.
Here I write out the full list of states in I4 as follows.
I4 = {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}[{(xy0,yx1,yy1)}[{(xy1,xx0,yx0)}[{(yx1,xy0,yy0}
[{(xx0,xy0,xx1,yx1)}[{(xx0,xy0,xy1,yx1)}[{(xx0,xy0,xy1,yy1)}
[{(xx0,yx0,xx1,xy1)}[{(xx0,yy0,xx1,yy1)}[{(xx0,yy0,xy1,yx1)}
[{(xx0,yy0,xy1,yy1)}[{(xy0,yx0,xx1,yx1)}[{(xy0,yx0,xx1,yy1)}
[{(xy0,yx0,xy1,yx1)}[{(xy0,yy0,yx1,yy1)}[{(yx0,yy0,xx1,yx1)}
[{(yx0,yy0,xx1,yy1)}[{(yx0,yy0,xy1,yy1)}[{(xx0,xy0,yx0,yy0,xx1,xy1,yx1,yy1)}.
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Consider z 2 {(yx0,xx1,xy1)}. For z to be a steady state, I require that
zyx0d+ zxx1a+ zxy1a= zyx0a+ zxx1a+ zxy1c= zyx0a+ zxx1b+ zxy1d.
I have zyx0zxy1 =
a d
a c ,
zxx1
zxy1
= d ca b , then N = zxy1(
a2 ab ad+bd+ad+c2 cd ac+a2 ab ac+bc
(a c)(a b) ).
So I have
zxy1 =
N(a  c)(a b)
2a2 2ab+bd+ c2  cd 2ac+bc ,
zyx0 =
N(a d)(a b)
2a2 2ab+bd+ c2  cd 2ac+bc ,
and zxx1 =
N(a  c)(d  c)
2a2 2ab+bd+ c2  cd 2ac+bc .
This state is not absence robust therefore not a steady state.
Consider z 2 {xy0,yx1,yy1}. For z to be a steady state, first I require that
zxy0a+ zyx1d+ zyy1d = zxy0d+ zyx1a+ zyy1c= zxy0d+ zyx1b+ zyy1d.
Solving this I get
zxy0
zyx1
= d ba b ,
zyy1
zyx1
= a bd c . Then I have
zyz1 =
N(a b)(d  c)
d2 2bd  cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac ,
zxy0 =
N(d b)(d  c)
d2 2bd  cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac ,
and zyy1 =
N(a b)2
d2 2bd  cd+2bc+a2 2ab+b2+ad ac .
This state is not absence robust therefore not a steady state.
Consider a state z 2 {xx0,yx0,xx1,xy1}. For z to be a steady state, first I require that
zxx0a+ zyx0c+ zxx1a+ zxy1a= zxx0b+ zyx0d+ zxx1a+ zxy1a
= zxx0a+ zyx0a+ zxx1a+ zxy1c= zxx0a+ zyx0a+ zxx1b+ zxy1d.
Solving this I get zxx0zyx0 =
d c
a b ,
zxx1
zxy1
= d ca b ,
zyx0
zxy1
= 1. Then zyx0 = zxy1 =
(a b)N
2(d c+a b) and
zxx0 = zxx1 =
(d c)N
2(d c+a b) .
Again this state is not absence robust therefore not a steady state.
For all other states in I5, a similar analysis is carried out and it can be shown each state
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in I4 is not absence robust. Intuitively, the payoff balances are too delicate. Consider a
state in which both x and y are played by a trait as their intra-trait action. Then for the
state to be payoff steady, then the payoffs of playing x and y as their intra-trait action must
be the same. But this state now cannot be absence robust as the absence of any player in
the interaction causes the payoffs of x and as intra-trait action to be different. A similar
argument holds for states in which both x and y are played by a trait as their inter-trait
action. Therefore I5\C = /0.
Now consider I2. Notice that the state in I2 is not absence robust so I2\C = /0.
Since C is nonempty and 8z,z0 2 I1, vz = vz0 , I have
C = I1.
Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX 2C
Now I characterize the proof of Theorem 2.3. A moment of reflection shows that the
cost function remains the same on the new state space Z0, i.e., for all z,z0 2 Z0, I have
cz,z0 = |b(z)  z0|1.
Proof [Theorem 2.3].
Under this setting, the state space becomes a subset of N16, and the cost function still
remains the same after restraining the domain to the state space.
First, I characterize the set of steady states. There are three types of steady states:
pooling steady states where all players reside at one location, separating steady states where
each location is populated with exactly one trait and mixed steady states where one trait is
populated at both locations. I characterize the mixed first.
Suppose that both trait 0 and 1 are populated at both locations. Due to the absence
robustness condition, at any steady state the average payoffs of players at either location
from intra-trait or inter-trait interactions are in {a,d}. Now the players also must have
equal payoffs between the two locations which is impossible since a> ad > d (a+d)/2>
d > dd. Then there does not exist a steady state in which both traits are populated at both
locations.
Now suppose that trait 0 is populated at both locations and trait 1 only exists at one
location. Then at a steady state the players of trait 0 must all coordinate on the same
action with players of trait 1 due to absence robustness. Then the players of trait 1 must all
coordinate on the same action with players of trait 0 as well.
If players of trait 1 reside at location H, the players of trait 0 at location H must receive
either a or d from interacting with players of trait 1. Suppose there are k players of trait 0 at
location H. Then their payoff is in {a,d, Na+kdN+k , Nd+kaN+k }. Due to the the absence robustness
condition, Na+kdN+k ,
Nd+ka
N+k cannot be achieved at a steady state. Then similarly, there does not
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exist a steady state in which trait 0 is populated at both locations and trait 1 only reside at
location H.
If trait 1 resides at location L, the players of trait 0 at location L must receive either a or
d from interacting with players of trait 1. Suppose there are k players of trait 0 at location
L. Then their payoff is in {da,dd,d Na+kdN+k ,d ka+NdN+k }. Then similarly, due to the the absence
robustness condition, there does not exist a steady state in which trait 0 is populated at both
locations and trait 1 only reside at location L.
Since d > a+d2a , the only steady pooling state is z
⇤ = (zxx0,H = N,zxx1,H = N).
Now consider the separating steady states in which each location’s population consists
of one trait. I write
S= {z : zxx0,H + zxy0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N,Uxx1,H(z) da},
S0 = {z : zxx1,H + zxy1,H = N,zxx0,L+ zyx0,L = N,Uxx0,H(z) da},
S1 = {z : zyx0,H + zyy0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N,Uxx1,H(z) da,Uxx0,L(z) d},
S01 = {z : zxy1,H + zyy1,H = N,zxx0,L+ zxy0,L = N,Uxx0,H(z) da,Uxx1,L(z) d},
S2 = {z : zyx0,H + zyy0,H = N,zxy1,L+ zyy1,L = N,Uxx1,H(z) dd,Uxx0,L  d},
S02 = {z : zxy1,H + zyy1,H = N,zyx0,L+ zyy0,L = N,Uxx0,H(z) dd,Uxx1,L  d},
S3 = {z : zxx0,H + zxy0,H = N,zxy1,L+ zyy1,L = N,Uxx1,H(z) dd},
and S03 = {z : zxx1,H + zxy1,H = N,zxx0,L+ zyx0,L = N,Uxx1,H(z) dd}.
Then S[ S0 [ S1[ S2[ S01[ S02[ S3[ S03 is the set of all separating steady states. Note
that S2 and S02 can be empty for certain sets of parameters.
Now I examine these steady states.
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First by Lemma 2.2, all separating steady states in S have the same transition cost since
S is a maximal connected set. The same applies to S0, S1, S2, S3, S01, S02 and S03.
Next, I show that the escape cost of S satisfies EC(S)   ⌃ a ba b+d cN⌥. Notice that the
escape cost of S is upper bounded by the minimum cost from a state in S to a state outside
of B(S). I first show that the minimum cost from a state in S to a state outside of B(S) is at
least
⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
.
Whenever mutations occur to a state in S and results in zxy0,H <
a(1 d )
a c N, players of
trait 1 will have incentive to move to location H. Denote
SN = {z : zxx0,H + zxy0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N, 1N+1(zxx0,Ha+ czxy0,H +a)> ad}.
I show that SN is a subset of B(S). Take any state z0 2 SN and then take an update rule
b(·) that facilitates the following dynamic path for any state z0 2 SN for large enough N.
z0 = (z0xx0,H + z0xy0,H = N,z0xx1,L+ z0yx1,L = N) with
1
N+1 (z
0
xx0,Ha+ z
0
xy0,Hc+a)> ad
! (zxx0,H = z0xx0,H ,zxy0,H = z0xy0,H ,zxx1,H =
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L =
⌃
N · a ba b c+d
⌥
)
! zxx0,H = z0xx0,H ,zxy0,H = z0xy0,H ,zxx1,H =
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
,zyx1,H =
⌃
N · a ba b c+d
⌥
)
! (zxy0,H = N,zxx1,H =
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
,zyx1,H =
⌃
N · a ba b c+d
⌥
)
! (zxy0,H = N,zyx1,H = N)
This update rule is ’Weakly Darwinian’ during the third step if at that stage the payoff
of yx1 at location H is higher than the payoffs of xx1 and yx1 at location L, i.e., Nb+
N d ca b c+d a> da(1+
d c
a b c+d ). Hence such update rule exists when
ab b2 bc+bd+ad ac
a2 ab 2ac+2ad >
d .
Since d > a+d2a , I have that (zxy0,H =N,zyx1,H =N) is not a steady state. In other words,
players are better off coordinating on x amongst themselves at the inferior location than
coordinating on y with players of the opposite trait at the better location. Let b(·) be such
that (zxy0,H = N,zyx1,H = N) lies in the basin of attraction of a separating steady state in S.
Under b(·), I have z0 2 B(S). Therefore, mutations that cause the population at the inferior
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location to start to migrate to the better location do not escape the basin of attraction of S.
Then consider mutations to intra-trait actions. Starting from a steady state in S in which
all player with trait 0 reside at location H coordinating on x with players of trait 0, then
for players of trait 0 at location H the payoff of intra-trait action y becomes better than
the payoff of intra-trait action x when at least a ba b+d cN players mutate into choosing
action y as their intra-trait action. Then let the update rule be such that whenever less than⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
players of trait 0 mutate their intra-trait action, the resulting state will lead
right back to the original state. When at least
⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
players of trait 0 mutate their
intra-trait action, then let the update rule be such that the resulting state will lead right to
(zyx0,H = N,zxx1,L + zyx1,L = N) which is not a steady state since xx1 at location H has
higher payoff than xx1 and yx1 at location L. Let the update rule be such that the following
dynamic path is realized:
(zyx0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N)
! (zyx0,H = N,zxx1,H =
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N 
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
)
! (zyx0,H = N,zxx1,H =
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
,zyx1,H = N  
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
) which as shown
above lies in B(S).
For any mixed mutation to both intra-trait and inter-trait actions, let the update rule up-
date them sequentially. Consider z0 where z0xx0,H + z0xy0,H  
⌅
N · d ca b c+d
⇧
, z0xx0,L = z0xy0,L =
z0yx0,L = z0yy0,L = 0 and z0xx1,L+ z0yx1,L = N, and let the update rule be such that z0 leads to
a state in which all players with yx0 become members of xx0 and all players with yy0
become members of xy0. Then the resulting state lies in SN thus in B(S).
Up till now, I have concluded the case without mutation to locations.
Now consider any state z0 such that the cost from a state in S to z0 is at most
⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
.
Suppose k players of trait 0 mutate to location L, l players of trait 0 mutate to a different
group at location H, m players of trait 1 mutate to location H choosing x against players
of trait 0, n players of trait 1 mutate to location H choosing y against players of trait 0 and
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r players of trait 1 mutate to a different group at location L. The minimum payoff of xx0
at location H is (N k l)a+cl+am+cnN k+m+n and the maximum payoff of yx0 is
(N k l)b+dl+am+cn
N k+m .
The difference is D = (N k l)(a b) (d c)(l+n)N k+m+n . This difference is smallest only when l =⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
. Now suppose l =
⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥ u= a ba b+d cN u+v, where u is an integer
and v2 (0,1). The difference can be written asD= (u k)(a b)+(u n)(d c) v(a b c+d)N k+m . Now
since u  n+k, I have D  (n v)(a b)+(k v)(d c)N k+m . The u= 0 case is shown above. The only
case where D < 0 and u > 0 is when n = 1 if 1 vv <
d c
a b , i.e., v >
a b
a b c+d , or k = 1 if
1 v
v <
a b
d c , i.e., v>
d c
a b c+d . In either case the payoff of an player of trait 0 at location L
is at most d a+(N m n)dN m n+k < d. Similarly I can have the update rule be such that all players
of trait 0 at location H become yx0, and then the player of trait 0 at location L will move
to location H and become yx0. Then, as shown, the resulting state lies in B(S) therefore
z0 2 B(S).
When u> 1, xx0 has higher payoff than yx0 at location H and similarly xy0 at location
H has higher payoff than yy0 at location H. Let the update rule be such that all players with
xy0 at location H become xx0 and all players with yy0 at location H become xy0. Then
all players with yx1 at location H will become xx1 and all players with yy1 at location will
become xy1. Then the payoff of xx0 at location H is a, which is higher than the payoff for
any player at location L regardless of his or her actions. Let the update rule be such that
then all players of trait 0 at location L become xx0 at location H. Then as shown above,
z0 2 B(S). Therefore, all such z0 lie in B(S).
Therefore the minimum cost from a state in S to a state outside of B(S) is at least⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
, and then I can let the update rule be such that EC(S)  ⌃ a ba b+d cN⌥> 1 for
large enough N.
Now take a
z0 = (zyx0,H + zyy0,H = N,zxx1,L+ zyx1,L = N,zyx1,L =
⇠
da d
d (a  c)N
⇡
)
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and for large enough N, z0 2 S1. Consider its neighbour
z1 = (zyx0,H + zyy0,H = N,zxx1,L = N 
⇠
da d
d (a  c)N
⇡
+1,zyx1,L =
⇠
da d
d (a  c)N
⇡
 1.
From z1, players of trait 0 will move to location L. Let the update rule be such that z1
leads to (zxx0,L = N,zxx1,L = N 
l
da d
d (a c)N
m
+1,zyx1,L =
l
da d
d (a c)N
m
 1) and then (zxx0,L =
N,zxx1,L = N). This is not a steady state. Let the update rule be such that this leads to a
state in S. Then z1 2 B(S) and cz0,B(S) = 1 < EC(S). By Lemma 2.3, vS1 = vz0 > vS. Thus
S1\C = /0. Similarly S01\C = /0 as well.
Similar arguments hold for S2,S02,S3,S03. For each of them, I can find a state that is one
mutation away and in which players of one trait has incentive to move to the other location.
I can let the update rule be such that these states lead to a state in S. Then by Lemma 2.3,
none of them can contain a long run equilibrium.
Now consider the pooling steady state z⇤=(zxx0,H =N,zxx1,H =N) and let z1=(zxx0,H =
N,zxx1,H =
⌅ d c
a b c+dN
⇧
,zxy1,H =
⌃ a b
a b c+dN
⌥
). Then I can let the update rule be such
that z1 leads to z2 = (zxx0,H = N,zxy1,H = N), which is not a steady state with d > a+d2a .
Let the update rule be such that z2 leads to z3 = (zxx0,H = N,zxx1,L = N) 2 S. Then
z1 2 B(S). Now I have that the minimum cost from z⇤ to a state in B(S) is at most⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
, which is smaller than or equal to EC(S). Thus cz⇤,B(S) 
⌃ a b
a b+d cN
⌥
<
EC(S). By Lemma 2.3, I have vz⇤ > vS. Therefore z⇤ is not a long run equilibrium. Since
C\ (S1[ S01[ S2[ S02[ S3[ S03) = /0, I must have C ⇢ S[ S0. Then in any state in S or S0,
the traits are segregated at the two locations. Therefore in all long run equilibria, the traits
are segregated, i.e., each location’s population consists of only one trait.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX 3
Table 3.3 lists the abbreviations of the category names used in Table 3.4. Table 3.4
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shows the categories of the top ten performing variables for the prediction of each disease
for each feature space.
Table 3.3 Category Abbreviation
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Table 3.4 Categories of Top Performing Variables For Each Disease and Feature
Space
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